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Searching the Clouds

Until law enforcement routinely recognizes the Fourth
Amendment protects the cloud network, an additional added
protection is to continue to allow magistrates to impose restrictions
on computer warrants. Magistrates can do this by strictly enforcing
the particularity requirement and by placing strict parameters on
computer warrants. If a magistrate grants a warrant for a computer
hard drive, he should specifically note that the search cannot expand
onto the cloud. Then, if the agent oversteps his bounds, the defense
may use the warrant's imposed limitations to suppress any data seized
unlawfully from the cloud. Restrictions 'Such as limiting the search
parameters to the physical hard drive, requiring searches to be
conducted on copies of the hard drive instead of the actual computer,
or requiring that search of the computer takes place off-line223 will
prevent law enforcement from even "accidently" exceeding the bounds
If magistrates clearly and consistently apply
of the warrant.
restrictions to computer search warrants and suppress unlawfully
seized evidence from the cloud, law enforcement will get the message:
if they want to go beyond the physical hard drive, they must obtain a
separate warrant.
These additional steps will not interfere with law enforcement's
ability to continue to perform effective searches and seizures. Users of
the cloud network have not given up their expectation of privacy
simply because they choose to use the best means of data storage
available. When the user has not shared the documents through a
network beyond one he has created for himself, he has not exposed
the documents to the public and maintains his reasonable expectation
of privacy. The law must recognize this and must be willing to
develop criteria for the expectation of privacy to meet the demands of
the evolving technological world.

SAVING THE SPOTIFY REVOLUTION:
RECALIBRATING THE POWER
IMBALANCE IN DIGITAL COPYRIGHT
E. Jordan Teague1

ABSTRACT
Many believed that Spotify would revolutionize the music
industry, offering a legal alternative to file sharing that compensates
musicians for use of their digital music. Why, then, have artists been
abandoning the Spotify revolution in droves? Because the revolution
has a dark side. Since Spotify is partly-owned by major record labels,
it has a serious conflict of interest with independent artists. Spotify's
lack of transparency about its financial flows gives musicians further
reason to question whether the service has their interests in mind,
particularly in light of the microscopic royalties Spotify has paid
artists to date. This climate of suspicion has caused many artists to
abandon the service and pursue alternative means of digital
Even listeners have begun leaving
distribution and promotion.
Spotify on account of how it treats artists. Ironically, Spotify has
managed to alienate the very audiences it needs as allies: artists, who
supply Spotify's "unlimited" song library; and listeners, who fund the
service through subscriptions and advertising. As such, the Spotify
revolution is destined to fail-an unfortunate reality, as the streaming
music business model has great potential to benefit artists and serve
the under lying goals of copyright.
I argue that the most effective way to save the Spotify revolution
is through a compulsory licensing scheme. This is because the
primary impediment to Spotify changing its treatment of artists is its
insulation from competitive pressures, which ultimately stems from
the major labels' formidable bargaining position in digital sound
recordings. The labels have assumed a gatekeeping function in
streaming music, demanding corporate equity in exchange for access
to their so"und recordings, which every streaming service needs to
build a comprehensive catalog. As a result, the streaming music
market has very few participants, all of which are partially controlled
1.

223. In some cases, data saved in a cloud network account is not accessible
from a device that is off-line.

206

Jordan Teague is an associate at Burr & Forman LLP in Birmingham,
Alabama. She received her J .D. in 2012 from Vanderbilt University
Law School, where she was the Senior Technology Editor of the
Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law. Jordan
received her B.A. magna cum laude in Mathematics-Economics from
Furman University in 2005.

207

JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY&THElNTERNET ·VOL.

4 ·No. l · 2012

JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY&THElNTERNET ·VOL.

Saving the Spotify Revolution

by the major labels. Compulsory licensing would make the major
labels' sound recordings more readily accessible to would-be streaming
services.
A more competitive marketplace will lead to greater
transparency and fairer treatment of artists-and will ultimately
enable the Spotify revolution to succeed.

INTRODUCTION
When Spotify reached the U.S. market in mid-2011,
commentators acclaimed that "the future of music" was here. 2
Finally, legal access to a nearly unlimited catalog of music had
become possible. 3 Although sharing many of the same characteristics
as its illegal peer-to-peer predecessors like Napster, Spotify claimed to
have an objective that distinguished it from other file sharing sites:
compensating artists. 4 With potential to be the holy grail of musicunlimited songs for listeners with a paycheck for artists-Spotify
seemed to be on track to revolutionize the music industry for
consumers and musicians.
Why, then, have independent artists been abandoning this
revolution in droves? Because the revolution has a dark side. Artists
began growing suspicious of the service after receiving microscopic
royalty checks. 5 Though artists have urged it to divulge how it
calculates royalties, Spotify has been far from forthcoming with artists
about its financial flows, giving artists all the more reason to distrust
the service. 6 Further cementing this climate of suspicion is the fact
that the U.S. major record labels partly own the service, meaning that
the labels, as shareholders, did not necessarily have artists' interests
in mind during negotiations with Spotify. 7 Left in the dark, artists
must make a seemingly lose-lose choice: stay on Spotify and collect
miniscule royalties, or leave the service, forgoing Spotify revenue and
exposure. Many musicians have chosen the latter, abandoning Spotify
2.

Randall Roberts, Critic's Notebook: With Spotify, the Future of Music is
Here, POP & HISS: THE LA TIMES MUSIC BLOG (Jul. 22, 2011, 5:34 PM),
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/music_blog/2011/07/critics-notebookwith-spotify-the-future-of-music-is-here.html.

3.

Id. ("rUlnlimited access to a huge chunk of the world's recorded music
library ... has become reality.").

4.

Tom Krazit, @ FB: Highlights from Mark Zuckerberg's Keynote Address,
PAIDCONTENT
(Sept.
22,
2011,
9:51
PM),
http:/ /paidcontent.org/2011/09 /22/ 419-fS-highlights-from-mark.
zuckerbergs-keynote-address/ (noting that Daniel Ek, creator of Spot1fy,
"[S]tated [his service] 's goal was to help people discover more music
while fairly compensating artists.").

5.

See infra Part II.A.iii.

6.

See infra Part II.A.ii.

7.

See infra Part II.A.i.
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and pursuing alternate avenues of spreading their artistry. Even
listeners have begun leaving Spotify on account of how it treats
artists. Ironically, Spotify has managed to alienate the very audiences
it needs as allies: artists, who supply Spotify's "unlimited" song
library, and listeners, who fund the service through subscriptions and
advertising. As such, the Spotify revolution is destined to fail; yet
Spotify. continues to bow to the interests of the major labels.
While artists may have good reason to be distrustful, the
technology is not the problem. By reducing distribution costs for
artists and improving the public's access to creative works, the
streaming music business model could serve copyright's goals of
promoting creation and dissemination. 8 Further, Spotify could be a
viable way for musicians to monetize digital recordings if its user base
increases through network effects. 9 With promise to benefit artists,
the Spotify revolution does not need to be stifled-it needs to be
saved by recalibrating the power imbalance in the digital music
market.
This Note argues that the most effective way to save the Spotify
revolution is to enable a competitive marketplace through compulsory
10
Because of the dangerous combination of the labels'
licensing.
market share and their holdout right under copyright law, the major
labels sit as a formidable gatekeeper of the streaming music market,
deciding who will enter and on what terms. 11 This has resulted in a
marketplace consisting of only a handful of key participants, all of
whom are part-owned by the major labels. 12 I contend that a
compulsory licensing scheme, similar to those already in place in the
Copyright Act for other music markets, would dissolve the labels'
gatekeeping ability, for it would make the labels' catalogs available to
any potential streaming service. 13 Further, it would prevent the labels
from leveraging copyright ownership into streaming service
14
A more competitive marketplace will lead to greater
ownership.
transparency and fairer treatment of artists-and will ultimately
enable the Spotify revolution to succeed~

8.

See infra Part III.A.

9.

See infra Part III.A.

10.

See infra Part III.C.

11.

See infra Part III.B.

12.

See infra Part III.B.

13.

See infra Part III.C.

14.

See infra Part III.C.
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THE SPOTIFY REVOLUTION: STREAMING
MUSIC AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO FILE SHARING
I.

A.

Napster: An Illegal Means to the Inevitable End of Music Sharing

Napster, the forerunner of digital music sharing, made its debut
on June 1, 1999, before the days of Spotify, Pandora, and even
iTunes. 15 Napster's software allowed users around the globe to share
music libraries with one another. 16 Reaching nearly sixty million users
and forty million songs within its first year of operation, 17 N apster
offered a virtually limitless song collection. While Napster wasn't the
first music sharing service to emerge online, 18 it was the first to gain
widespread use because of its innovative utilization of peer-to-peer
technology. 19 Napster's predecessors required users to download entire
files from a single intermediary; 20 in contrast, Napster's peer-to-peer
client connected users directly during the file transfer process,
meaning that mp3 files never passed onto Napster's servers. 21 This

15.

16.

Tim Wu, When Code Isn't Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 679, 728 (2003) ("The
beta version of Napster debuted on June 1, 1999. Napster's
revolutionary design was a response to the legal and technical problems
of the web-based companies. As one commentator noted, '[Napster] was
written to solve a problem-[legal] limitations on file copying."')
(quoting Clay Shirky, What is P2P . . . And What Isn't?, THE
NETWORKS
(Nov.
24,
2000),
available
at
O'REILLY
http://openp2p.com/pub/a/p2p/2000/11/24/shirkyl-whatisp2p.html).
Nicholas M. Menasche, Note, Recording Industry Missteps: Suing
Anonymous Filesharers As A Last Resort, 26 PACE L. REV. 273, 280
(2005) ("Napster, the first filesharing program to receive national
attention, enabled users to: '(1) make MP3 music available for copying
by other Napster users; (2) search for MP3 music files stored on other
users' computers; and (3) transfer exact copies of the contents of other
users' MP3 files from one computer to another via the Internet.'
Napster's free MusicShare software and its system of servers enabled
this process.") (quoting A&M Records, Inc'. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d
1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001)).

17.

Id. (noting that Napster's sixty million users were sharing about forty
million songs by 2000).

18.

Wu, supra note 14 at 727 (describing earlier, more primitive, file-sharing
solutions that relied on a centralized server).

19.

Menasche, supra note 16 at 280.

20.

See Wu, supra note 15 at 727.

21.

Lital Helman, Note, When Your Recording Agency Turns into an
Agency Problem: The True Nature of the Peer-to-Peer Debate, 50 IDEA
49, 68 (2009) ("Napster's technology was the first file-sharing software
designed for exchanging music files that allowed transfer of such files
among its users without crossing its server. Napster's site included only
indexes of the songs that were actually residing on other users' hard
drives").
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feature gave Napster two distinct advantages. First, its file transfer
process was much faster than that of its rivals, who relied on a
centralized host to process requests. 22 Second, because Napster itself
did not process file transfers, it had a colorable argument against
copyright infringement liability. 23 Consequently, it managed to stay
afloat for over two years.
Given that nearly three-quarters of the files exchanged through
Napster were songs owned by major labels, 24 it was not long before
copyright owners hauled N apster into court for copyright
25
Unfortunately for Napster, the Ninth Circuit did not
infringement.
agree that its unique features absolved it of copyright infringement
26
Unable to sustain in court-ordered system monitoring for
liability.
copyright infringement and unable to persuade the major labels to
license their repertoire, N apster filed for bankruptcy in 2002. 27
N apster's demise hardly marked the end to file sharing, though.
Other services like Aimster and Grokster followed in Napster's
28
footsteps. As with Napster, copyright holders brought these services
to their knees through partially successful-and more significantly,
expensive-litigation. 29 Rights holders didn't limit their courtroom
warfare to file sharing services. ·The Recording Industry Association of
22.

Id.

23.

See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)
(holding that since Betamax technology was capable of substantial
noninfringing uses, constructive knowledge could not be imputed to
manufacturers due to manufacturer's sale to general public).

24.

Helman, supra note 21, at 68 ("About seventy percent of the materials
exchanged utilizing Napster's platform were copyrighted works owned
by record companies, who sued N apster for contributory and vicarious
infringement").

25.

A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001)
(alleging both direct and contributory copyright infringement).

26.

Id. at 1020-21 (noting that while Sony forbade imputing constructive
knowledge on Napster, since its software was capable of substantial noninfringing use, the record showed that Napster had actual knowledge of
infringement on its service).

27.

Helman, supra note 21, at 68-69.

28.

See Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright
Infringement Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345,
1359-66 (2004) (discussing Aimster and Grokster).

29.

See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913
(2005) (holding that Grokster was liable for contributory copyright
infringement for distributing software with the object of promoting its
use to infringe copyright); In re Aimster Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir.
2003) (affirming district court's granting of preliminary injunction on
basis that recording industry had demonstrated a likelihood of
prevailing on the merits of its copyright infringement claim).
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America (RIAA) also embarked on an extensive, unpopular lawsuit
campaign against individual file sharers. 30 The recording industr?''s
repeated choice of litigation over licensing showed that the maJor
labels viewed file sharing as the industry's number one enemy. Yet,
despite the RIAA's expensive game of whack-a-mole, file sharing lived
on as new services like LimeWire emerged to replace those put
under. 31
While the major labels viewed file sharing as a threat, other music
industry stakeholders thought quite differently-that file sharing
represented a healthy market that was simply in need of
monetization.
Industry leaders like Eddie Schwartz, renowned
songwriter and President of the Songwriters Association_ of C~nada
(SAC), noted that file sharing is simply the modern mamfestat10n of
the innate inevitable human urge to share music. 32 Rather than
wasting e~ergy trying to stop the inevitable music sharing
phenomenon, says Schwartz, the industry should focus on how to
monetize it. 33 Over the past several years, scholars and industry
leaders have proposed a number of models for monetizing existing file
sharing activity. Schwartz and SAC have advocated for an opt-in
blanket license, issued to end users via their Internet service providers
(ISPs).34 For a nominal monthly fee of around $5, users would have
the right to download as many files as they wished. 35 Others have

suggested proposals from a mandatory "music tax" to wholesale
copyright reform. 36 While these proposals have generated much
discussion, none have been implemented, probably because each
would likely require substantial legislation. 37
Although the power of congressional inertia largely stifled these
proposals, an innovative entrepreneur in Sweden would soon introduce
a legal alternative to file sharing that required zero legislative
intervention.

30.

See Helman, supra note 21, at 70.

31.

Menasche, supra note 16 at 283-84 (noting that programs like LimeWire
and Bearshare emerged and instead of a central server model, these
programs "rapidly pass along search queries from machine to ma~hine
along the network--making it legally difficult to stop since there is no
one computer in charge").

32.

Our Proposal: Summary, SONGWRJTERS Assoc. OF CANADA (Jan. 2011),
http://songwriters.ca/proposalsummary.aspx ("Peopl~ have always
shared music and always will. The music we share defmes who we are,
and who our friends and peers are. The importance of music in the
fabric of our own culture, as well as those around the world, is
inextricably bound to the experience of sharing.").

33.

34.

35.

Id. ("Rather than continuing to engage in increasingly ~tile efforts to
stop people from using new technologies to share music, we at the
Songwriters Association of Canada believe this massive use of ~reators'
work should be licensed just as live performances and broadcastmg, also
initially considered infringement, were ultimately licensed in t~e past. In
both these previous examples, new business models, dynamic growth,
and decades a wonderful music ensued").
Id. ("ISPs would partner with collectives in order to facilitate the
licensing process. Access and content could be bundled. The proposed
license fee would appear as a line item on monthly Internet access
statements sent to consumers by ISPs").
Id. ("Private individuals and households who wish to music file-share
would be licensed to do so in conjunction with an agreement to pay a
reasonable monthly license fee. The license would cover the private,

212

B.

Spotify: A Legal Alternative to File Sharing

Music streaming service Spotify opened its digital doors to
listeners in Europe in October 2008. 38 Spotify was the brainchild of
Daniel Ek, a then-27 year old web entrepreneur who had already been
running tech startup companies for ten years prior to starting
Spotify. 39 Aformer Napster user himself, Ek "saw an opportunity to
create something that made it easier for people to do the stuff that
they were already doing, but legally. "40 Ek aspired to create a legal
music sharing service that possessed many of the desirable features of
its illegal predecessors. 41 To realize his vision, Ek recruited the
creator of the popular file sharing client uTorrent to develop Spotify's
peer-to-peer system. 42 Just as Ek envisioned, Spotify provides much
noncommercial sharing of music, between two or more parties, using any
Internet-based file-sharing client . . . [C]onsumers may opt out if they
self-declare not to music file-share").
36.

See Neil W. Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free
Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2004); Ankur
Srivastava, The Anti-Competitive Music Industry and the Case for
Compulsory Licensing in the Digital Distribution of Music, 22 TOURO L.
REV. 375, 394-95 (2007).

37.

Although the SAC proposal could theoretically be accomplished through
voluntary licensing, it is unlikely that such an approach would be
successful in light of the major labels' negotiating history.

38.

Neal Pollack, Spotify Is the Coolest Music Service You Can't Use
WIRED
(Dec.
27,
2010),
available
at
http://www.wired.com/magazine/2010/12/mf_spotify/all/1
("Spotify
launched in October 2008 and began its European invasion").

39.

Id. ("Ek has been running tech companies for more than a decade. The
first was a web design business he launched in 1997 while still a
teenager living in a Stockholm suburb. He later worked ~s the CTO for
Stardoll, a virtual paper-doll site for tween girls; started an advertising
company that got purchased by the Internet marketing outfit
Tr~deDoubler; and was part of Tradera, a Swedish auction company,
which eBay bought in 2006").

40.

Id.

41.

Id. ("Ek wanted to create a legal service that offered the convenience
and immediacy of file-sharing programs like the original Napster").

42.

Id.

213

JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY& Tim INTERNET. VOL. 4. No.1·2012

JouRNALOFLAw, TECHNOLOGY&THEINTERNET · VoL.4 · No.1·2012

Saving the Spotify Revolution

Saving the Spotify Revolution

America (RIAA) also embarked on an extensive, unpopular lawsuit
campaign against individual file sharers. 30 The recording industr(s
repeated choice of litigation over licensing showed that the maJor
labels viewed file sharing as the industry's number one enemy. Yet,
despite the RIAA's expensive game of whack-a-mole, file sharing lived
on as new services like LimeWire emerged to replace those put
under. 3 i
While the major labels viewed file sharing as a threat, other music
industry stakeholders thought quite differently-that file sharing
represented a healthy market that was simply in need of
Industry leaders like Eddie Schwartz, renowned
monetization.
songwriter and President of the Songwriters Association. of C~nada
(SAC), noted that file sharing is simply the mode~n mamfestat10n of
the innate inevitable human urge to share music. 32 Rather than
wasting e~ergy trying to stop the inevitable music sharing
phenomenon, says Schwartz, the industry should focus on . how to
monetize it. 33 Over the past several years, scholars and mdustry
leaders have proposed a number of models for monetizing existing fi~e
sharing activity. Schwartz and SAC have advocated f?r an o~t-m
blanket license, issued to end users via their Internet service providers
(ISPs). 34 For a nominal monthly fee of around $5, users would have
the right to download as many files as they wished. 35 Others have

suggested proposals from a mandatory "music tax" to wholesale
copyright reform. 36 While these proposals have generated much
discussion, none have been implemented, probably because each
would likely require substantial legislation. 37
Although the power of congressional inertia largely stifled these
proposals, an innovative entrepreneur in Sweden would soon introduce
a legal alternative to file sharing that required zero legislative
intervention.

30.

See Helman, supra note 21, at 70.

31.

MenascM, supra note 16 at 283-84 (noting that programs like LimeWire
and Bearshare emerged and instead of a central server model, these
programs "rapidly pass along search queries from mac~ine to ma?hine
along the network--making it legally difficult to stop smce there is no
one computer in charge").

32.

Our Proposal: Summary, SONGWRITERS Assoc. OF CANADA (Jan. 2011),
http://songwriters.ca/proposalsummary.aspx ("Peopl~ have always
shared music and always will. The music we share defmes who we are,
and who our friends and peers are. The importance of music in the
fabric of our own culture, as well as those around the world, is
inextricably bound to the experience of sharing.").

33.

34.

35.

Id. ("Rather than continuing to engage in increasingly TI:tile efforts to
stop people from using new technolo.gies to. share . music, we at th~
Songwriters Association of Canada believe this massive use of ?reators
work should be licensed just as live performances and broadcastmg, also
initially considered infringement, were ultimately licensed in t~e past. In
both these previous examples, new business models, dynamic growth,
and decades a wonderful music ensued").
Id. ("ISPs would partner with collectives in order to facilitate the
licensing process. Access and content could be bundled. The proposed
license fee would appear as a line item on monthly Internet access
statements sent to consumers by ISPs").
Id. ("Private individuals and households who wish to music file-share
would be licensed to do so in conjunction with an agreement to pay a
reasonable monthly license fee. The license would cover the private,
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B.

Spotify: A Legal Alternative to File Sharing

Music streaming service Spotify opened its digital doors to
listeners in Europe in October 2008. 38 Spotify was the brainchild of
Daniel Ek, a then-27 year old web entrepreneur who had already been
running tech startup companies for ten years prior to starting
Spotify. 39 A former Napster user himself, Ek "saw an opportunity to
create something that made it easier for people to do the stuff that
they were already doing, but legally. "40 Ek aspired to create a legal
music sharing service that possessed many of the desirable features of
its illegal predecessors. 4 i
To realize his vision, Ek recruited the
creator of the popular file sharing client uTorrent to develop Spotify's
peer-to-peer system. 42 Just as Ek envisioned, Spotify provides much
noncommercial sharing of music, between two or more parties, using any
Internet-based file-sharing client . . . [C]onsumers may opt out if they
self-declare not to music file-share").
36.

See Neil W. Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free
Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2004); Ankur
Srivastava, The Anti-Competitive Music Industry and the Case for
Compulsory Licensing in the Digital Distribution of Music, 22 TOURO L.
REV. 375, 394-95 (2007).

37.

Although the SAC proposal could theoretically be accomplished through
voluntary licensing, it is unlikely that such an approach would be
successful in light of the major labels' negotiating history.

38.

Neal Pollack, Spotify Is the Coolest Music Service You Can't Use
WIRED
(Dec.
27,
2010),
available
at
http://www.wired.com/magazine/2010/12/mf_spotify/all/1
("Spotify
launched in October 2008 and began its European invasion").

39.

Id. ("Ek has been running tech companies for more than a decade. The
first was a web design business he launched in 1997 while still a
teenager living in a Stockholm suburb. He later worked ~s the CTO for
Stardoll, a virtual paper-doll site for tween girls; started an advertising
company that got purchased by the Internet marketing outfit
TradeDoubler; and was part of Tradera, a Swedish auction company,
which eBay bought in 2006").

40.

Id.

41.

Id. ("Ek wanted to create a legal service that offered the convenience
and immediacy of file-sharing programs like the original Napster").

42.

Id.
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of the same appeal as illegal file sharing clients. It gives users access
to a nearly limitless catalogue-15 million songs, as of July 2011. 43
Further, the service enables users to easily share songs, albums, and
playlists with other Spotify users via Facebook integration. 44 Unlike
its illegal counterparts, Spotify does not allow users to download mp3
files without first purchasing them in addition to the monthly
subscription. 45 So, although the service does not give users absolute
control over discrete files, Spotify does offer two other key features of
file-sharing clients: access and sharing.
Spotify wasn't the first streaming service on the block: Rhapsody,
a paid music subscription service, opened in 2001, seven years before
the advent of Spotify. 46 Spotify differs from most of its competitors,
though, in its "freemium" philosophy-attract users with a limitedfeature, free version of your product, then convert a percentage of
these users to a premium, paid subscription version. 47 Sean Parker,
founder of N apster and a recent Spotify investor, described at a recent
tech conference how freemium works for Spotify:
You end up building a music library that's 100 times bigger than
anything you've ever had, and at that point you have no choicewe've got you by the balls. If you want that content on your iPod,
you're going to have to pay for it; if you want that content on your
iPhone, you're going to have to become a subscriber. 48
Spotify offers three tiers of accounts: Spotify Free, Spotify
Unlimited, and Spotify Premium. 49 Spotify's free subscription gives

users access to the service's entire music catalog, but limits the
number of songs a user may play each month. 50 The free account is
advertising-funded, featuring both audio and graphic advertising
formats. 51 Since Spotify has not released a standardized rate sheet
nor have any of Spotify's advertising contract terms become public, it'
is not clear how much the service makes per month from advertising
revenue. Spotify Unlimited provides an unlimited, advertising-free
listening experience for $5 per month. 52 At $10 per month, Spotify
Premium includes features like offline listening, a mobile app,
enhanced sound quality, exclusive content, early ·album releases, and
sound system compatibility. 53

43.

Dan Check, Spotify vs. Girl Talk: What Is Spotify's Music Catalog
Missing?,
SLATE
(Jul.
22,
2011,5:53
PM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/browbeat/2011/07 /22/spotify_vs_girl_tal
k_what_is_spotify_s_music_catalog_missing_.html.

44.

What is Spotify?, SPOTIFY, http://www.spotify.com/us/about/what/
(last visited Nov. 24, 2011).

45.

Music
Purchases,
http://www.spotify.com/us/about/features/music-purchases/
visited Nov. 24, 2011).

46.

47.

SPOTIFY,
(last

Curt Woodward, Rhapsody at 10 Years: Surviving Long Enough to Face
a Herd of New Competitors, XCONOMY (Nov. 30, 2011),
http://www.xconomy.com/seattle/2011/11/30/rhapsody-at-10/
(describing Rhapsody as "one of the original subscription music services
in the U.S." and recognizing its existence since 2001).
Katherine Heires, Why It Pays to Give Away the Store, Bus. 2.0, Oct. 1,
2006, available at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/business2/
businese2_archive/2006/10/01/8387115/indext.htm
(describing
freemium and detailing steps for how to effectively make money from
the freemium model).

48.

Pollack, supra note 37.

49.

Get
Spotify
Free,
SPOTIFY,
http://www.spotify.com/us/getspotify /open/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2011).

214

C.

How Musicians Make Money on Spotify

· Though inspired by illicit file sharing activity and sharing m~ny
of the characteristics of illegal peer-to-peer clients, Spotify aims to
accomplish something that Napster and its peers did not: monetizing
music on artists' behalf. 54 Spotify's activities implicate three rights
under U.S. federal copyright law: the public performance, mechanical,
and sound recording rights. 55 Spotify acquires licenses from the
intermediaries who manage these rights. 56 These intermediaries, in
turn, pay a share of royalties to artists and songwriters based on preexisting contracts.
Since streaming music requires that copies of songs be made,
Spotify must pay mechanical royalties owed to songwriters and
publishers because U.S.C. § 106(3) gives the owners of musical works
the exclusive right to reproduce "phonorecords. "57 Unlike other
licenses required for streaming, the mechanical license is compulsory,
so Spotify does not negotiate with anyone, but simply pays
mechanical royalties to the Harry Fox Agency, an agency that collects

50.

Id.

51.

Advertising,
SPOTIFY, .
http://www.spotify.com/us/work-withus/advertisers/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2011).
·

52.

Get Spotify Free, supra note 48.

53.

Id.

54.

Krazit, supra note 3.

55.

See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2010); See also 17 U.S.C. § 114; 17 U.S.C. § 106
(2002).

56.

Id.

57.

17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2002)."Phonorecords" are "material objects in which
sounds, other than those accompanying a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, are fixed by any method now known or later
developed, and from which the sounds can be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010).
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of the same appeal as illegal file sharing clients. It gives users access
to a nearly limitless catalogue-15 million songs, as of July 2011. 43
Further, the service enables users to easily share songs, albums, and
playlists with other Spotify users via Facebook integration. 44 Unlike
its illegal counterparts, Spotify does not allow users to download mp3
files without first purchasing them in addition to the monthly
subscription. 45 So, although the service does not give users absolute
control over discrete files, Spotify does offer two other key features of
file-sharing clients: access and sharing.
Spotify wasn't the first streaming service on the block: Rhapsody,
a paid music subscription service, opened in 2001, seven years before
the advent of Spotify. 46 Spotify differs from most of its competitors,
though, in its "freemium" philosophy-attract users with a limitedfeature, free version of your product, then convert a percentage of
these users to a premium, paid subscription version. 47 Sean Parker,
founder of N apster and a recent Spotify investor, described at a recent
tech conference how freemium works for Spotify:
You end up building a music library that's 100 times bigger than
anything you've ever had, and at that point you have no choicewe've got you by the balls. If you want that content on your iPod,
you're going to have to pay for it; if you want that content on your
iPhone, you're going to have to become a subscriber. 48
Spotify offers three tiers of accounts: Spotify Free, Spotify
Unlimited, and Spotify Premium. 49 Spotify's free subscription gives

users access to the service's entire music catalog, but limits the
number of songs a user may play each month. 50 The free account is
advertising-funded, featuring both audio and graphic advertising
formats. 51 Since Spotify has not released a standardized rate sheet,
nor have any of Spotify's advertising contract terms become public, it
is not clear how much the service makes per month from advertising
revenue. Spotify Unlimited provides an unlimited, advertising-free
listening experience for $5 per month. 52 At $10 per month, Spotify
Premium includes features like offline listening, a mobile app,
enhanced sound quality, exclusive content, early ·album releases, and
sound system compatibility. 53

43.

Dan Check, Spotify vs. Girl Talk: What Is Spotify's Music Catalog
Missing?,
SLATE
(Jul.
22,
2011,5:53
PM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/browbeat/2011/07 /22/spotify_vs_girl_tal
k_what_is_spotify_s_music_catalog_missing_.html.

44.

What is Spotijy?, SPOTIFY, http://www.spotify.com/us/about/what/
(last visited Nov. 24, 2011).

45.

Music
Purchases,
http://www.spotify.com/us/about/features/music-purchases/
visited Nov. 24, 2011).

46.

47.

SPOTIFY,
(last

Curt Woodward, Rhapsody at 10 Years: Surviving Long Enough to Face
a Herd of New Competitors, XCONOMY (Nov. 30, 2011),
http://www.xconomy.com/seattle/2011/11/30/rhapsody-at-10/
(describing Rhapsody as "one of the original subscription music services
in the U.S." and recognizing its existence since 2001).
Katherine Heires, Why It Pays to Give Away the Store, Bus. 2.0, Oct. 1,
2006, available at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/business2/
businese2_archive/2006/10/01/8387115/indext.htm
(describing
freemium and detailing steps for how to effectively make money from
the freemium model).

48.

Pollack, supra note 37.

49.

Get
Spotify
Free,
SPOTIFY,
http://www.spotify.com/us/getspotify /open/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2011).
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C.

How Musicians Make Money on Spotify

Though inspired by illicit file sharing activity and sharing m~ny
of the characteristics of illegal peer-to-peer clients, Spotify aims to
accomplish something that Napster and its peers did not: monetizing
music on artists' behalf. 54 Spotify's activities implicate three rights
under U.S. federal copyright law: the public performance, mechanical,
and sound recording rights. 55 Spotify acquires licenses from the
intermediaries who manage these rights. 56 These intermediaries, in
turn, pay a share of royalties to artists and songwriters based on preexisting contracts.
Since streaming music requires that copies of songs be made,
Spotify must pay mechanical royalties owed to songwriters and
publishers because U.S.C. § 106(3) gives the owners of musical works
the exclusive right to reproduce "phonorecords. "57 Unlike other
licenses required for streaming, the mechanical license is compulsory,
so Spotify does not negotiate with anyone, but simply pays
mechanical royalties to the Harry Fox Agency, an agency that collects

50.

Id.

51.

SPOTIFY, .
http://www.spotify.com/us/work-withAdvertising,
us/advertisers/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2011).
·

52.

Get Spotijy Free, supra note 48.

53.

Id.

54.

Krazit, supra note 3.

55.

See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2010); See also 17 U.S.C. § 114; 17 U.S.C. § 106
(2002).

56.

Id.

57.

17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2002). "Phonorecords" are "material objects in which
sounds, other than those accompanying a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, are fixed by any method now known or later
developed, and from which the sounds can be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010).
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mechanical license royalties on behalf of rights holders. 58 Harry Fox,
in turn, pays royalties to rights holders, after retaining a small
percentage fee. 59 In contrast to the public performance and sound
recording licenses, it requires absolutely no bargaining over royalty
rates. All Spotify must do to obtain a mechanical license is pay the
statutory rate to Harry Fox. 60
Since streaming music counts as a "public performance" under the
Copyright Act, 61 Spotify must license the public performance right for
its entire catalog. However, Spotify does not negotiate these licenses
directly from publishers or songwriters; rights holders generally
delegate this responsibility to a performing rights organization
("PR0"). 62 Thus, to secure the public perform~nc~ right for ~usical
works, Spotify negotiates with PROs, who d1stnbute royalties to
songwriters and publishers on a pro rata basis. 63 Spotify reac~ed
deals with PROs such as,· the American Society of Composers, Artists
and Producers (ASCAP); 64 Broadcast Music Inc (BMI); 65 and the
Society of European Stage Authors and Composers (SESAC) 66 right
before the service's U.S. launch. These licenses were more difficult for
Spotify to obtain than the mechanical license since the public
58.

Ed Christman, Harry Fox Agency Inks Deal With Spotify for Publishing
And
More,
BILLBOARD
(Jul.
18,
2011),
Licensing,
http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/industry /publishing/harry-fox-agencyinks-deal-with-spotify-1005281812.story; About Harry Fox Agency,
HARRYFOX AGENCY, http:/ /www.harryfox.com/public/ AboutHF A.jsp
(last visited Nov. 24, 2011) (noting that Harry Fox Agency is the
leading mechanical licensing agency in the U.S.).

59.

Id.

60.

Id.

61.

17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010) (to perform a work publicly means "to transmit
or otherwise communicate a performance ... to the public, by means of
any device or process, whether the members of the public capable ?f
receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or m
separate places and at the same time or at different times").

62.

See AL KOHN & BOB KOHN, KOHN ON MUSIC LICENSING (Aspen 3d.
Edition 2002) (noting that ASCAP and BMI control performance rights
for almost all the music performed in the U.S.).

63.

See infra notes 63-5.

64.

Billboard Staff, ASCAP Announces U.S. Licensing Agreement With
Spotify,
BILLBOARD
(Jul.
14,
.
2011),
http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/industry /publishing/ascap-announcesu-s-licensing-agreement-1005277172.story.

65.

BMI Inks Spotify to Licensing Deal, ALL ACCESS (Jul. 25, 2011),
http://www.allaccess.com/net-news/archive/story /94194/bmi-inksspotify-to-licensing-deal.

66.

SESAC Finalizes Deal With Spotify, SESAC.coM (Jul. 22, 2011),
http://www.sesac.com/N ews /N ews_Details.aspx?id=l 5 75.
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performance rights are not technically compulsory. Nonetheless, the
two biggest U.S.-based PROs, ASCAP and BMI, are subject to
antitrust consent decrees that effectively compel them to license. 67 If
Spotify had not been able to reach an agreement with ASCAP or
BMI, the New York district court, designated as the "rate court,"
would have judicially determined the terms of the agreement based on
a "willing buyer, willing seller" standard. 68
In addition to royalties for the public performance right-a right
owned by publishers and songwriters-Spotify must pay royalties to
the owners of sound recordings in accordance with 17 U.S.C. § 106(6),
which gives sound recording owners the exclusive right to "perform
the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio
transmission. "69 Under the Digital Right in Sound Recordings Act, a
service provider is eligible for a statutory compulsory license of a
sound recording if the service is "non-interactive," whereas
"interactive" service providers must negotiate directly with rights
70
holders.
A service is interactive if it "enables a member of the
public to receive a transmission of a program specially created for the
recipient, or on request, a transmission of a particular sound
recording, whether or not as part of a program, which is selected by
or on behalf of the recipient. "71 Internet radio services like Pandora
are "non-interactive" because they give listeners minimal input into
what they hear. 72 In contrast, since Spotify allows users to build
individualized playlists and play songs on demand, it is an
67.

See United States v. American Society of Composers, Authors &
Publishers, 1941 Trade Cas. (CCH) para. 56, 104, 1941 U.S. Dist. Lexis
3944 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); United States v. Broad. Music Indus., 1940-1943
Trade Cas. (CCH) para. 56,096 (E.D. Wis. 1941).

68.

For a description and example of a "rate court" setting agreement
terms, see David Oxenford, Rate Court Determines ASCAP Fees for
Large Webcasters - Some Interesting Contrasts with The Copyright
Royalty Board Decision, BROAD. LAW BLOG (May 1, 2008),
http://www.broadcastlawblog.com/2008/05/articles/internet-radio/ratecourt-determines-ascap-fees-for-large-webcasters-some-interestingcontrasts-with-the-copyright-royalty-board-decision (examining a 2008
New York district court decision where the court set agreement terms
between ASCAP and Yahoo, AOL, and Real Networks for use of
ASCAP's composers' music).

69.

u.s.c. § 106(6) (2002).
17 u.s.c. § 115 (2010).
17 u.s.c. § 114(j)(7) (2010).

70.
71.

72.

17

Ari Z. Moskowitz, Predictability and Interactivity: An Examination of
Arista Records, LLC v. Launch Media, Inc., 38 AIPLA Q.J. 471, 496
(2010) ("Pandora, by far the best-known Internet radio service today,
implemented technology similar to LAUNCHcast, such as prohibiting
rewinding and limiting the number of times a user can skip a song, in
order to remain within the bounds of a noninteractive service").
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mechanical license royalties on behalf of rights holders. 58 Harry Fox,
in turn, pays royalties to rights holders, after retaining a small
percentage fee. 59 In contrast to the public performance and sound
recording licenses, it requires absolutely no bargaining over royalty
rates. All Spotify must do to obtain a mechanical license is pay the
statutory rate to Harry Fox. 60
Since streaming music counts as a "public performance" under the
Copyright Act, 61 Spotify must license the public performance right for
its entire catalog. However, Spotify does not negotiate these licenses
directly from publishers or songwriters; rights holders generally
delegate this responsibility to a performing rights organization
("PR0"). 62 Thus, to secure the public perform~nc~ right for ~usical
works, Spotify negotiates with PROs, who distribute royalties to
songwriters and publishers on a pro rata basis. 63 Spotify reac~ed
deals with PROs such as,· the American Society of Composers, Artrnts
and Producers (ASCAP); 64 Broadcast Music Inc (BMI); 65 and the
Society of European Stage Authors and Composers (SESAC) 66 right
before the service's U.S. launch. These licenses were more difficult for
Spotify to obtain than the mechanical license since the public
58.

Ed Christman, Harry Fox Agency Inks Deal With Spotify for Publishing
And
More,
BILLBOARD
(Jul.
18,
2011),
Licensing,
http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/industry /publishing/harry-fox-agencyinks-deal-with-spotify-1005281812.story; About Harry Fox Agency,
HARRYFOX AGENCY, http:/ /www.harryfox.com/public/ AboutH~ A.jsp
(last visited Nov. 24, 2011) (noting that Harry Fox Agency is the
leading mechanical licensing agency in the U.S.).

59.

Id.

60.

Id.

61.

17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010) (to perform a work publicly means "to transmit
or otherwise communicate a performance ... to the public, by means of
any device or process, whether the members of the public capable ?f
receiving the performance ·or display receive it in the same place or m
separate places and at the same time or at different times").

62.

See AL KOHN & BOB KOHN, KOHN ON MUSIC LICENSING (Aspe11; 3d.
Edition 2002) (noting that ASCAP and BMI control performance nghts
for almost all the music performed in the U.S.).

63.

See infra notes 63-5.

64.

Billboard Staff, ASCAP Announces U.S. Licensing Agreement With
Spotify,
BILLBOARD
(Jul.
14,
.
2011),
http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/industry /publishing/ascap-announcesu-s-licensing-agreement-1005277172.story.

65.

BMI Inks Spotify to Licensing Deal, ALL ACCESS (Jul. 25, 2011),
http://www.allaccess.com/net-news/archive/story /94194/bmi-inksspotify-to-licensing-deal.

66.

SESAC Finalizes Deal With Spotify, SESAC.coM (Jul. 22, 2011),
http://www.sesac.com/News/News_Details.aspx?id=1575.
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performance rights are not technically compulsory. Nonetheless, the
two biggest U.S.-based PROs, ASCAP and BMI, are subject to
antitrust consent decrees that effectively compel them to license. 67 If
Spotify had not been able to reach an agreement with ASCAP or
BMI, the New York district court, designated as the "rate court,"
would have judicially determined the terms of the agreement based on
a "willing buyer, willing seller" standard. 68
In addition to royalties for the public performance right-a right
owned by publishers and songwriters-Spotify must pay royalties to
the owners of sound recordings in accordance with 17 U.S.C. § 106(6),
which gives sound recording owners the exclusive right to "perform
the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio
transmission. "69 Under the Digital Right in Sound Recordings Act, a
service provider is eligible for a statutory compulsory license of a
sound recording if the service is "non-interactive," whereas
"interactive" service providers must negotiate directly with rights
70
A service is interactive if it "enables a member of the
holders.
public to receive a transmission of a program specially created for the
recipient, or on request, a transmission of a particular sound
recording, whether or not as part of a program, which is selected by
or on behalf of the recipient. "71 Internet radio services like Pandora
are "non-interactive" because they give listeners minimal input into
what they hear. 72 In contrast, since Spotify allows users to build
individualized playlists and play songs on demand, it is an
67.

See _United States v. American Society of Composers, Authors &
Publishers, 1941 Trade Cas. (CCH) para. 56, 104, 1941 U.S. Dist. Lexis
3944 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); United States v. Broad. Music Indus., 1940-1943
Trade Cas. (CCH) para. 56,096 (E.D. Wis. 1941).

68.

For a description and example of a "rate court" setting agreement
terms, see David Oxenford, Rate Court Determines ASCAP Fees for
Large Webcasters - Some Interesting Contrasts with The Copyright
Royalty Board Decision, BROAD. LAW BLOG (May 1, 2008),
http://www.broadcastlawblog.com/2008/05/articles/internet-radio/ratecourt-determines-ascap-fees-for-large-webcasters-some-interestingcontrasts-with-the-copyright-royalty-board-decision (examining a 2008
New York district court decision where the court set agreement terms
between ASCAP and Yahoo, AOL, and Real Networks for use of
ASCAP's composers' music).

69.

u.s.c. § 106(6) (2002).
17 u.s.c. § 115 (2010).
17 u.s.c. § 114(j)(7) (2010).

70.
71.

72.

17

Ari Z. Moskowitz, Predictability and Interactivity: An Examination of
Arista Records, LLC v. Launch Media, Inc., 38 AIPLA Q.J. 471, 496
~2010) ("Pandora, by far the best-known Internet radio service today,
implemented technology similar to LAUNCHcast, such as prohibiting
rewinding and limiting the number of times a user can skip a song, in
order to remain within the bounds of a noninteractive service").
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"interactive" service provider that must negotiate licenses with sound
recording owners.
Spotify has direct deals with the major U.S. labels-deals that
took over two years to negotiate. 73 Spotify does not negotiate directly
with independent labels or artists, but rather, contracts with artist
aggregators74 like CD Baby, who in turn have contracts with
independent artists, 75 and the Merlin Network, a rights agency that
represents independent labels worldwide. 76
The amount
intermediaries pay to artists is determined by pre-existing contracts.
Undoubtedly, sound recording licenses are the most difficult licenses
for Spotify to obtain. Unlike the mechanical and public performance
rights, which are both .essentially compulsory, the sound recording
right is completely negotiable. Thus, Spotify had the difficult task of
persuading sound recording owners-in particular, the major labelsto license their libraries.

But Spotify was different from these other streaming services in
one critical respect-its "freemium" philosophy. For the first two
years of Spotify's existence, the U.S. major labels spoke out against
freemium streaming services, concerned about Spotify's single-digit
free-to-paid conversion rate. 80 Even as late as February 2010, Warner
Music CEO Edgar Bronfman, Jr. reported to Wired that "this sort of
'get all the music you want for free and then maybe we can-with a
few bells and whistles-move you to a premium price' strategy is not
the kind of approach to business that we will be supporting in the
future." 81 Nonetheless, Spotify persisted through two years of arduous
negotiations, finally striking deals with the majors in mid-2011-a
point to be discussed more below. 82
With the major labels on board in the U.S. market, the Spotify
ship was sailing toward success. Or was it? As it turns out, artists
have not shared Daniel Ek's optimism about the service's potential to
welcome in a golden age of music-and with good reason.

D.

Spotify's

au.s.

Invasion": Persuading the Major Labels

Spotify was not available in the U.S. until late 2011, when it
finally closed deals with the major record labels. 77 Getting the major
labels on board was critical to a successful U.S. launch, for without
the major labels' catalogues, Spotify's library would have indeed been
spotty. 78 Despite the major labels' blemished history of attempting to
chokehold music distribution, 79 ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC had
already licensed its libraries to other music streaming services like
Rhapsody and Rdio for use in the United States. Persuading the
labels to join Spotify was not a pipe dream.

73.

See infra Part I.D.

74.

An "artist aggregator" is a company that serves as a one-stop shop for
independent artists seeking to distribute their music. Artist aggregators
help artists distribute their music through physical CD sales, mp3
downloads, and streaming services. For an example, see About CD
Baby, CDBABY.COM, http://www.cdbaby.com/ About (last visited Nov.
24, 2011).

75.

Artist Page, SPOTIFY, http://www.spotify.com/us/work-with-us/labelsand-artists/artist-page (last visited Nov. 24, 2011).

76.

Welcome
to
Merlin,
MERLIN
NETWORK,
http://www.merlinnetwork.org/home/ (last visited Nov. 24; 2011).

77.

See Roberts, supra note 1 (describing initial reaction to Spotify's
American debut).

78.

See 2010 Quarter 1 Marketshare for Major Music Labels,
ROUTENOTE.COM (Mar. 26, 2010) (reporting that major labels had over
803 combined market share in 2010).

79.

See Srivastava, supra note 35, at 394-95. (discussing how major labels
used cooperative marketing programs to monopolize CD distribution).
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II.

DESTINED FOR DOWNFALL: WHY THE SPOTIFY
REVOLUTION WILL FAIL

At first glance, it seems puzzling that musicians would not be
cheering on a service designed to monetize digital music. A closer
look shows why artists indeed have reason to fear Spotify. The U.S.
major record labels are significant shareholders in the service; this
means that t}+ey have insider influence over Spotify and suggests that
the labels' incentives were not aligned with those of artists when they
were negotiating license agreements. 83
Spotify's refusal to be
transparent about its financial flows suggests that money is passing
by artists and disappearing into the 'black box' of shareholder (i.e.
major label) profits. 84 The fact that independent artists earn paltry
royalties worth fractions of a cent makes this possibility even more

80.

Ben Sisario, Spotify Steps Closer to U.S. With Universal Deal, N.Y.
TIMES MEDIA DECODER BLOG (Jun.
10, 2011, 6:42 PM),
http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/10/spotify-steps-closerto-u-s-with-universal-deal ("Throughout their long negotiations with
Spotify, American label executives were concerned that the company's
conversion rate of free to paid users was too low, and that the company
was giving away too much music").

81.

Pollack, supra note 37.

82.

See Brendan Greeley, Spotify Wins Over Music Pirates With Labels'
Approval,
BLOOMBERG
(Jul.
14,
2011,
10:46
AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-14/spotify-wins-over-musicpirates-with-labels-approval-correct-.html.

83.

See infra Part II.A.i.

84.

See infra Part II.A.ii.
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"interactive" service provider that must negotiate licenses with sound
recording owners.
Spotify has direct deals with the major U.S. labels-deals that
took over two years to negotiate. 73 Spotify does not negotiate directly
with independent labels or artists, but rather, contracts with artist
aggregators74 like CD Baby, who in turn have contracts with
independent artists, 75 and the Merlin Network, a rights agency that
represents independent labels worldwide. 76
The amount
intermediaries pay to artists is determined by pre-existing contracts.
Undoubtedly, sound recording licenses are the most difficult licenses
for Spotify to obtain. Unlike the mechanical and public performance
rights, which are both .essentially compulsory, the sound recording
right is completely negotiable. Thus, Spotify had the difficult task of
persuading sound recording owners-in particular, the major labelsto license their libraries.

But Spotify was different from these other streaming services in
one critical respect-its "freemium" philosophy. For the first two
years of Spotify's existence, the U.S. major labels spoke out against
freemium streaming services, Concerned about Spotify's single-digit
free-to-paid conversion rate. 80 Even as late as February 2010, Warner
Music CEO Edgar Bronfman, Jr. reported to Wired that "this sort of
'get all the music you want for free and then maybe we can-with a
few bells and whistles-move you to a premium price' strategy is not
the kind of approach to business that we will be supporting in the
future. "81 Nonetheless, Spotify persisted through two years of arduous
negotiations, finally striking deals with the majors in mid-2011-a
point to be discussed more below. 82
With the major labels on board in the U.S. market, the Spotify
ship was sailing toward success. Or was it? As it turns out, artists
have not shared Daniel Ek's optimism about the service's potential to
welcome in a golden age of music-and with good reason.

D.

Spotify's "U.S. Invasion": Persuading the Major Labels

Spotify was not available in the U.S. until late 2011, when it
finally closed deals with the major record labels. 77 Getting the major
labels on board was critical to a successful U.S. launch, for without
the major labels' catalogues, Spotify's library would have indeed been
spotty. 78 Despite the major labels' blemished history of attempting to
chokehold music distribution, 79 ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC had
already licensed its libraries to other music streaming services like
Rhapsody and Rdio for use in the United States. Persuading the
labels to join Spotify was not a pipe dream.

73.

See infra Part I.D.

74.

An "artist aggregator" is a company that serves as a one-stop shop for
independent artists seeking to distribute their music. Artist aggregators
help artists distribute their music through physical CD sales, mp3
downloads, and streaming services. For an example, see About CD
Baby, CDBABY.COM, http://www.cdbaby.com/ About (last visited Nov.
24, 2011).

75.

Artist Page, SPOTIFY, http://www.spotify.com/us/work-with-us/labelsand-artists/artist-page (last visited Nov. 24, 2011).

76.

Welcome
to
Merlin,
MERLIN
NETWORK,
http://www.merlinnetwork.org/home/ (last visited Nov. 24; 2011).

77.

See Roberts, supra note 1 (describing initial reaction to Spotify's
American debut).

78.

See 2010 Quarter 1 Marketshare for Major Music Labels,
ROUTENOTE.COM (Mar. 26, 2010) (reporting that major labels had over
803 combined market share in 2010).

79.

See Srivastava, supra note 35, at 394-95. (discussing how major labels
used cooperative marketing programs to monopolize CD distribution).
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look shows why artists indeed have reason to fear Spotify. The U.S.
major record labels are significant shareholders in the service; this
means that they have insider influence over Spotify and suggests that
the labels' incentives were not aligned with those of artists when they
were negotiating license agreements. 83
Spotify's refusal to be
transparent about its financial flows suggests that money is passing
by artists and disappearing into the 'black box' of shareholder (i.e.
major label) profits. 84 The fact that independent artists earn paltry
royalties worth fractions of a cent makes this possibility even more

80.

Ben Sisario, Spotify Steps Closer to U.S. With Universal Deal, N.Y.
TIMES MEDIA DECODER BLOG (Jun. 10, 2011, 6:42 PM),
http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/10/spotify-steps-closerto-u-s-with-universal-deal ("Throughout their long negotiations with
Spotify, American label executives were concerned that the company's
conversion rate of free to paid users was too low, and that the company
was giving away too much music").

81.

Pollack, supra note 37.

82.

See Brendan Greeley, Spotify Wins Over Music Pirates With Labels'
Approval,
BLOOMBERG
(Jul.
14,
2011,
10:46
AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-14/spotify-wins-over-musicpirates-with-labels-approval-correct-.html.
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See infra Part II.A.i.
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likely. 85 As music listeners increasingly substitute streaming music for
mp3 purchases, independent artists are left with the choice of
remaining on the service and earning pennies or abandoning the
services and potentially earning nil on recorded music. 86 Many artists
have chosen the latter, leaving Spotify in hopes of finding other ways
to monetize their music. 87 Similarly, once-loyal customers have begun
defecting from the service, disturbed by its treatment of the artists
they love. Ironically, Spotify has managed to alienate the very people
whose interests they claim to advocate-the same people on whom
they rely for success. Without the buy-in of musicians, Spotify
cannot realize its vision of providing "[a]ll the music, all the time, "88
nor can it expect to attract avid music fans, who care about artist
compensation.
A.
1.

The Dark Side of Spotify

Conflict of Interest with Artists

From their monopoly over CD sales to their litigious battle
against file sharing, the major record labels have a long history of
trying to maintain a chokehold on music distribution. Not much has
changed with the emergence of streaming music, as the major labels
A search of Sweden's
have an ownership stake in Spotify. 89
corporation records database confirmed that both the major labels
and the Merlin Network purchased about 183 of Spotify- worth
$250 million at that time90-for a little less than $10,000. 91 This has
two powerful implications.
First, equity means a seat at Spotify's board of directors' table.
With a reputation for maximizing profits at the expense of artists, the
major labels are hardly a musician's first choice for a director of
Spotify.
Second, the major labels, as copyright holders and
shareholders, earn money from Spotify from two sources: 1) royalties,
which are shared with artists; and 2) profits, which are not shared
85.

See infra Part II.A.iii.

86.

See infra Part II.B.

87.

See infra Part II.B.

88.

What Can Spotify Do?, SPOTIFY, http://www.spotify.com/us/about/
features/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2012).

89.

Helienne Lindvall, Behind the Music: The Real Reason Why the Major
Labels Love Spotify, THE GUARDIAN MUSIC BLOG (Aug. 17, 2009, 10:03
AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/music/musicblog/2009/aug/17 /majorlabels-spotify:

90.

Glenn Peoples, Is Spotify Really Worth 1 Billion?, BILLBOARD (Feb. ~2,
2011), http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/industry /digital-and-mobile/1sspotify-really-worth-l-billion-l 005043612.story.

91.

Lindvall, supra note 88.
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with artists.
This means that the labels' interests were not aligned
with artists' interests during negotiations with Spotify. In other
words, the labels may have been happy with lower-than-fair royalty
rates, since they stood to earn money from Spotify through other
avenues.
For both of these reasons, Spotify has an inescapable conflict of
interest with artists, one that has not gone unnoticed by the
independent music community.
For instance, independent label
Prosthetic Records announced in mid-September that it would be
pulling its artists· from Spotify because "[i]ndependent labels are
getting the short end of the stick. "93 Prosthetic noted that since the
major labels have an equity stake in Spotify, artists at major labels
are effectively treated with preference over independent artists. 94
According to Prosthetic, "Spotify as it's currently configured will 'kill
... smaller bands that are already struggling to make ends meet. '" 95
2.

Lack of Financial Transparency

Suspicious of Spotify for its involvement with the major labels,
artists and fans have expressed a desire to know where the money
goes once it passes into Spotify's hands. Nonetheless, Spotify has
resisted releasing information about how it allocates revenue. Spotify
gives canned, general responses to inquiries about its financial flows,
saying that it "ha[s] deals with all the major record labels and
recording rights institutions to ensure that artists receive
compensation for being part of Spotify, "96 or that it, "respect[s]
creativity and believe[s] in fairly compensating artists for their work.
[Spotify has] cleared the rights to use the music you'll listen to in

92.

See Pascal-Emmanuel Gobry, How Spotify's Business Works, BUSINESS
INSIDER (Oct. 12, 2011), http://articles.businessinsider.com/2011-1012/research/30269526_1_spotify-revenues-cost (detailing how Spotify
makes its money and describing how it must pay royalties to record
labels).

93.

Vince Neilstein, Breaking: Prosthetic Records Will Pull Artists From
Spotify,
METALSUCKS
(Sept.
16,
2011,
1:00
PM),
http://www.metalsucks.net/2011/09/16/breaking-prosthetic-recordswill-pull-out-spotify.

94.

Id.

95.

Jason Roche, Prosthetic Records is the Third L.A. Metal Label to Pull
Their Catalog Off of Spotify, LAWEEKLY BLOGS (Sept. 16, 2011 5:00
AM), http:/ /biogs.la weekly .com/westcoastsound/2011/09 /
prosthetic_records_also_pullin.php.

96.

Spotify Forum, GETSATISFACTION, http://getsatisfaction.com/spotify/
topics/does_the_artists_i_listen_to_get.:._paid (last visited Nov. 24,
2011).
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likely. 85 As music listeners increasingly substitute streaming music for
mp3 purchases, independent artists are left with the choice of
remaining on the service and earning pennies or abandoning the
services and potentially earning nil on recorded music. 86 Many artists
have chosen the latter, leaving Spotify in hopes of finding other ways
to monetize their music. 87 Similarly, once-loyal customers have begun
defecting from the service, disturbed by its treatment of the artists
they love. Ironically, Spotify has managed to alienate the very people
whose interests they claim to advocate--the same people on whom
they rely for success. Without the buy-in of musicians, Spotify
cannot realize its vision of providing "[a]ll the music, all the time, "88
nor can it expect to attract avid music fans, who care about artist
compensation.
A.

1.

The Dark Side of Spotify

Conflict of Interest with Artists

From their monopoly over CD sales to their litigious battle
against file sharing, the major record labels have a long history of
trying to maintain a chokehold on music distribution. Not much has
changed with the emergence of streaming music, as the major labels
A search of Sweden's
have an ownership stake in Spotify. 89
corporation records database confirmed that both the major labels
and the Merlin Network purchased about 183 of Spotify- worth
$250 million at that time90-for a little less than $10,000. 91 This has
two powerful implications.
First, equity means a seat at Spotify's board of directors' table.
With a reputation for maximizing profits at the expense of artists, the
major labels are hardly a musician's first choice for a director of
Spotify.
Second, the major labels, as copyright holders and
shareholders, earn money from Spotify from two sources: 1) royalties,
which are shared with artists; and 2) profits, which are not shared
85.

See infra Part II.A.iii.

86.

See infra Part II.B.

87.

See infra Part II.B.

88.

What Can Spotify Do?, SPOTIFY, http://www.spotify.com/us/about/
features/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2012).

89.

Helienne Lindvall, Behind the Music: The Real Reason Why the Major
Labels Love Spotify, THE GUARDIAN MUSIC BLOG (Aug. 17, 2009, 10:03
AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/music/musicblog/2009/aug/17 /majorlabels-spotify:

90.

Glenn Peoples, Is Spotify Really Worth 1 Billion?, BILLBOARD (Fe?· ~2,
2011), http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/industry /digital-and-mob1le/1sspotify-really-worth-l-billion-l 005043612 .story.

91.

Lindvall, supra note 88.

220

4

·No.

l · 2012

Saving the Spotify Revolution
92

with artists.
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rates, since they stood to earn money from Spotify through other
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For both of these reasons, Spotify has an inescapable conflict of
interest with artists, one that has not gone unnoticed by the
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For instance, independent label
Prosthetic Records announced in mid-September that it would be·
pulling its artists· from Spotify because "[i]ndependent labels are
getting the short end of the stick. "93 Prosthetic noted that since the
major labels have an equity stake in Spotify, artists at major labels
are effectively treated with preference over independent artists. 94
According to Prosthetic, "Spotify as it's currently configured will 'kill
... smaller bands that are already struggling to make ends meet. "' 95
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goes once it passes into Spotify's hands. Nonetheless, Spotify has
resisted releasing information about how it allocates revenue. Spotify
gives canned, general responses to inquiries about its financial flows,
saying that it "ha[s] deals with all the major record labels and
recording rights institutions to ensure that artists receive
compensation for being part of Spotify, "96 or that it, "respect[s]
creativity and believe[s] in fairly compensating artists for their work.
[Spotify has] cleared the rights to use the music you'll listen to in

92.

See Pascal-Emmanuel Gobry, How Spotify's Business Works, BUSINESS
INSIDER (Oct. 12, 2011), http://articles.businessinsider.com/2011-1012 /research/30269526_1_spotify-revenues-cost (detailing how Spotify
makes its money and describing how it must pay royalties to record
labels).

93.

Vince Neilstein, Breaking: Prosthetic Records Will Pull Artists From
Spotify,
METALSUCKS
(Sept.
16,
2011,
1:00
PM),
http://www.metalsucks.net/2011/09/16/breaking-prosthetic-recordswill-pull-out-spotify.

94.

Id.

95.

Jason Roche, Prosthetic Records is the Third L.A. Metal Label to Pull
Their Catalog Off of Spotify, LAWEEKLY BLOGS (Sept. 16, 2011 5:00
AM), http://blogs.laweekly.com/westcoastsound/2011/09/
prosthetic_records_also_pullin.php.

96.

Spo_tify Forum, GETSATISFACTION, http://getsatisfaction.com/spotify/
top1cs/does_the_artists_i_listen_to_get.:_paid (last visited Nov. 24,
2011).
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Spotify. "97 As one band put it, "we have no idea how they carve up
the money. They only disclose this information to the [m}ajor record
labels. "98
Spotify's silence about its revenue allocation raises several
questions. The first is: how big is the copyright royalty pie? It is
unclear whether and to what extent both of Spotify's revenue
sources-advertising and subscriptions-contribute to royalty
payments. How much does Spotify allocate to royalties, and how
much disappears into the proverbial 'black box'-that is, money not
attributed to royalties which remains with Spotify's investors
(including the major labels)? 99
The second question is: how does Spotify divide up the copyright
Since mechanical royalties are
royalty pie among intermediaries?
fixed by statute, Harry Fox Agency's slice of the pie is fairly
ascertainable. 100 How Spotify doles out the rest of the pie is difficult
to determine, for its contracts with the PROs, labels, and artist
aggregators hide behind non-disclosure agreements. 101 Without more
information, independent artists are left to suspect they are treated
less favorably than major label artists. Some commentators believe
that major label artists "get much better streaming rates than the
[independent artists]. "102 Others have surmised that major label

artists get a cut of advertising revenue, whereas independent artists
do not. 103 As one artist put it, if the major labels did, in fact, "use
their large catalogs as leverage to earn higher rates per stream . . .
[t]his moves the music industry in the opposite direction of the past
decade, possibly to a much worse, unbalanced landscape. "104
Each of these questions gives artists and music fans more reason
to wonder whether artists are getting a fair cut of Spotify's revenue. 105

97.

Sasha Muller, The Sinister Side of Spotify, PC PRO BLOGS (Mar. 5,
2010),
http://www.pcpro.co.uk/blogs/2010/03/05/the-sinister-side-ofspotify.

98.

Mike Masnick, How Much Does a Band Make From Various Music
TECHDIRT
(Sept.
11,
2011,
1:57
PM),
Platforms?,
http://www.techdirt.com/blog/casestudies/articles/20110911/002844158
91/how-much-does-band-make-various-music-platforms.shtml (emphasis
added).

99.

Lindvall, supra note 88. ("For artists who 'signed up to a label' there's a
tangible risk that revenue which comes from a possible sale of shares by
the label would end up in the proverbial 'blackbox' (non-attributable
revenue that remains with the label). There's growing concern about
this in the artist management community and, a few weeks ago, Bob
Dylan decided to pull his back catalogue from UK streaming services.
The only Dylan albums currently on Spotify are Bob Dylan's 60s Live,
A 30th Anniversary Concert Celebration, a tribute compilation and a
few tracks that are featured on movie soundtracks.").

100. 17

u.s.c. § 115 (2010).

101. Ben Rooney, Spotify Will Find U.S. Tough to Crack, WALL ST.J. TECHEUROPE BLOG (Jul. 14, 2011, 3:45 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/techeurope/2011/07 /14/spotify-will-find-u-s-tough-to-crack.

3.

Paltry Payouts to Independent Artists

Layers of non-disclosure agreements may disguise the mechanics
behind Spotify's financial flow, but thanks to the Internet and a
growing multitude of outspoken and disgruntled artists, it is no longer
a secret that artists earn miniscule royalties from Spotify's service.
This fact amplifies concern about Spotify's lack of transparency,
reinforcing the fear that money may be disappearing into the 'black
box'.
A number of artists began opening their accounting books to the
Internet community to reveal what they earned on Spotify. One
independent band, Marwood, made its actual account statements
from CD Baby available to the publfo, which showed a per-stream
rate of $0.0008. 106 Financial reports from another band, Only Seven
Left, revealed another troubling fact: not only were its songs earning
royalties worth peanuts, but the same song earned substantially
different royalty rates during the same day. 107 For instance, on
103. See Zoe Keating, Zoe Keating on Spotify, Fairness to Indie Artists &
Music's
Niche
Economy,
HYPEBOT
(Sept.
2011),
http://www.hypebot.com/hypebot/2011/09/zoe-keating-on-spotifyfairness-to-indie-artists-musics-niche-economy.html ("[T]he word on the
street is that majors receive profits from Spotify's advertising revenue
and indies do not."); see also Aubin, Another Label Leaves Spotify,
PUNKNEWS.ORG (Nov. 14, 2011, 6:00 PM), http://www.punknews.org/
article/45174 (asserting that indie artists "only get a 503 share of ad
revenue on a pro-rata basis which has been relatively inconsequential").
104. Cameron
Mizell,
Spotify
From
a
Musician's
Perspective,
MUSICIANWAGES.COM (Sept. 27, 2011), http://www.musicianwages.com/
the-working-musician/ spotify-from-a-musicians-perspective.
·
105. A third, related question-though independent of Spotify's revenue
allocation-is how do intermediaries in turn pay artists and songwriters?
Although artists are aware of the terms of their contracts, listeners are
not. This creates a third layer of opacity about financial flows for
listeners, who care about artist compensation. See infra note 154.
106. DIGITAL DISTRIBUTION SALES SUMMARY, http://cl.ly/
2hOHOd393D3R3flf2Zlo/o (last visited Nov. 24, 2011).

102. Lindvall, supra note 88; see Should You Put Your Music On Spotify?,
LIVE
UNSIGNED
BLOG
(Jul.
12,
2011,
1:57
PM),
http://www.liveunsigned.com/blog/2011/07 /should-you-put-your-musicon-spotify (asserting that "the major labels had to get a higher rate to
get them on board with Spotify").

107. DIGITAL DISTRIBUTION SALES SUMMARY, http://www.digimuziek.nl/
nieuws/wpcontent/uploads/2011/06/bramosll.png (last visited Nov. 24,
2011).
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Spotify." 97 As one band put it, "we have no idea how they carve up
the money. They only disclose this information to the [m}ajor record
labels. "98
Spotify's silence about its revenue allocation raises several
questions. The first is: how big is the copyright royalty pie? It is
unclear whether and to what extent both of Spotify's revenue
sources-advertising and subscriptions-contribute to royalty
payments. How much does Spotify allocate to royalties, and how
much disappears into the proverbial 'black box'-that is, money not
attributed to royalties which remains with Spotify's investors
(including the major labels)? 99
The second question is: how does Spotify divide up the copyright
Since mechanical royalties are
royalty pie among intermediaries?
fixed by statute, Harry Fox Agency's slice of the pie is fairly
ascertainable. 100 How Spotify doles out the rest of the pie is difficult
to determine, for its contracts with the PROs, labels, and artist
aggregators hide behind non-disclosure agreements. 101 Without more
information, independent artists are left to suspect they are treated
less favorably than major label artists. Some commentators believe
that major label artists "get much better streaming rates than the
[independent artists]. "102 Others have surmised that major label

artists get a cut of advertising revenue, whereas independent artists
do not. 103 As one artist put it, if the major labels did, in fact, "use
their large catalogs as leverage to earn higher rates per stream . . .
[t]his moves the music industry in the opposite direction of the past
decade, possibly to a much worse, unbalanced landscape. "104
Each of these questions gives artists and music fans more reason
to wonder whether artists are getting a fair cut of Spotify's revenue. 105

97.

Sasha Muller, The Sinister Side of Spotify, PC PRO BLOGS (Mar. 5,
2010),
http://www.pcpro.co.uk/blogs/2010/03/05/the-sinister-side-ofspotify.

98.

Mike Masnick How Much Does a Band Make From Various Music
(Sept.
11,
2011,
1:57
PM),
Platforms?, ' TECHDIRT
http://www.techdirt.com/blog/casestudies/articles/20110911/002844158
91 /how-much-does-band-make-various-music-platforms.shtml (emphasis
added).

99.

Lindvall, supra note 88. ("For artists who 'signed up to a label' there's a
tangible risk that revenue which comes from a possible sale of shares by
the label would end up in the proverbial 'blackbox' (non-attributable
revenue that remains with the label). There's growing concern about
this in the artist management community and, a few weeks ago, Bob
Dylan decided to pull his back catalogue from UK streaming services.
The only Dylan albums currently on Spotify are Bob Dylan's 60s Live,
A 30th Anniversary Concert Celebration, a tribute compilation and a
few tracks that are featured on movie soundtracks.").

100. 17

u.s.c. § 115 (2010).

101. Ben Rooney, Spotify Will Find U.S. Tough to Crack, WALL ST.J. TECHEuROPE BLOG (Jul. 14, 2011, 3:45 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/techeurope/2011/07 /14/spotify-will-find-u-s-tough-to-crack.

3.

Paltry Payouts to Independent Artists

Layers of non-disclosure agreements may disguise the mechanics
behind Spotify's financial flow, but thanks to the Internet and a
growing multitude of outspoken and disgruntled artists, it is no longer
a secret that artists earn miniscule royalties from Spotify's service.
This fact amplifies concern about Spotify's lack of transparency,
reinforcing the fear that money may be disappearing into the 'black
box'.
A number of artists began opening their accounting books to the
Internet community to reveal what they earned on Spotify. One
independent band, Marwood, made its actual account statements
from CD Baby available to the publlc, which showed a per-stream
rate of $0.0008. 106 Financial reports from another band, Only Seven
Left, revealed another troubling fact: not only were its songs earning
royalties worth peanuts, but the same song earned substantially
different royalty rates during the same day. 107 For instance, on
103. See Zoe Keating, Zoe Keating on Spotify, Fairness to Indie Artists f:f
Music's
Niche
Economy,
HYPEBOT
(Sept.
2011),
http://www.hypebot.com/hypebot/2011/09/zoe-keating-on-spotifyfairness-to-indie-artists-musics-niche-economy.html ("[T]he word on the
street is that majors receive profits from Spotify's advertising revenue
and indies do not."); see also Aubin, Another Label Leaves Spotify,
Pu:rKNEWS.ORG (Nov. 14, 2011, 6:00 PM), http://www.punknews.org/
article/45174 (asserting that indie artists "only get a 50% share of ad
revenue on a pro-rata basis which has been relatively inconsequential").
104. Cameron
Mizell,
Spotify
From
a
Musician's
Perspective,
MUSICIANWAGES.COM (Sept. 27, 2011), http://www.musicianwages.com/
the-working-musician/spotify-from-a-musicians-perspective.
105. A third, related question-though independent of Spotify's revenue
allocation-is how do intermediaries in turn pay artists and songwriters?
Although artists are aware of the terms of their contracts, listeners are
not. This creates a third layer of opacity about financial flows for
listeners, who care about artist compensation. See infra note 154.
106. DIGITAL DISTRIBUTION SALES SUMMARY, http://cl.ly/
2hOHOd393D3R3flf2Zlo/o (last visited Nov. 24, 2011).

102. Lindvall, supra note 88; see Should You Put Your Music On Spotify?,
LIVE
UNSIGNED
BLOG
(Jul.
12,
2011,
1:57
PM),
http://www.liveunsigned.com/blog/2011/07 /should-you-put-your-musicon-spotify (asserting that "the major labels had to get a higher rate to
get them on board with Spotify").

107. DIGITAL DISTRIBUTION SALES SUMMARY, http://www.digimuziek.nl/
nieuws/wpcontent/uploads/2011/06/bramosll.png (last visited Nov. 24
2011).
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January 15 2011 its song "Safe & Sound" earned $0.0011 per stream
'
'
in one instance
and
$0.0106 per stream in anot h er. 108 y e•t another
band, Uniform Notion, divulged its earnings to the blogosphere, but
added some context by calculating what it stood to earn from one
Spotify listener: 109

Lady Gaga's payout from 1 million Spotify streams of her hit song
"Poker Face" was a mere $167.00. 115 $167.00 may be a little better
than a gobstopper covered in fluff, but if that is the royalty payout
~or an interna~ional pop star like Lady Gaga, how could an
mdependent artrnt expect to make any money from Spotify's service?
4.

With Spotify, we'll get 0.003 EUR per play.
If you listen to the album all the way through, we'll get 0.029
EUR.
If you listen to the album 10 times on Spotify, we'll get 0.29
EUR

Spotify's lack of transparency about its financial flows, combined
with its involvement with the major record labels and its paltry
royalty rates, creates what Patrick Rackrow, chairman of the British
Academy of Songwriters, Composers and Authors ("BASCA"), calls a
"climate of suspicion" within the music community:

If you listen to it a hundred times, we'll get 2.94 EUR

[T]here is no clear trail that can be established so that the
songwriter can trace back what they ought to have got. These
things are behind a blanket of secrecy, and that is extremely
worrying. The danger is that these deals all become so secret
that the mist that descends creates uncertainty, creates fear.
That allied to the fact that the sums being paid through are
very small creates a climate of suspicion. I think that harms
Spotify, it harms the writers' perception of Spotify and this is a
service that they want to support. 116

If you listen to the album I,000 times (once a day for 3 years!)

we'll get 29.47 EUR! 110

-

To highlight the absurdity of Spotify's royalties, the website
Information is Beautiful released a chart entitled "Selling Out," which
depicted how much artists earn online from various sou:ces. m The
chart showed how many units-be it CDs, mp3s, or music streamsthe artist would have to sell per month to make minimum wage in the
United States. 112 Where a signed artist would need to sell about 4,000
CDs or 12,000 mp3 downloads to r~~ch minimum wage,_ t~~ same
artist would need to deliver over 4 million streams on Spotify.
Just
five days after the Information is Beautiful chart_ hit. the Internet,
British newspaper The Guardian released an article m early 2010
entitled "Sell 1m records today and you'll earn a half-sucked
gobstopper covered in fluff. "114 The article reported that superstar

3

108. Id.
109. How Much Does a Band Make From Various Music Platforms?,
TECHDIRT (Sept. 12, 2011, 1:57 PM), http://www.techdirt.com/
blog/casestudies/articles/20110911/00284415891/how-much-does-bandmake-various-music-platforms.shtml.
110. Id.
111. How Much Do Artists Earn Online?, INFO. IS BEAUTIFUL (Apr. ~3,
2010), http://www.informationisbeautiful.net/2010/how-much-do-mus1cartists-earn-online.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Sam Leith, Sell 1m Records Today and You'll Earn a Ha~f-Suc;:d
Gobstopper Covered in Fluff, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 18, 2010, 5.30 ~ ),
http://www.guardian.eo.uk/music/2010/apr/18/sam-leith-downloadmgmoney-spotify.
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"Climate of Suspicion": Artists Left in the Dark

As Rackrow suggests, Spotify's behavior degrades its reputation
among artists and writers, threatening to convert would-be advocates
into abandoners.
Turning Allies Into Enemies: Artists f3 Listeners Defecting From
Spotify

B.

With a blanket of secrecy over their eyes, musicians must make
an ill-informed, seemingly lose-lose choice. Should artists stay on
Spotify and collect miniscule royalties from their music? Or, should
they leave the service, forgoing Spotify revenue altogether? Spotify
advocates argue that artists who drop out of Spotify are "totally
missing the point," because they forgo the benefits of the service in:
exchange for nothing. 117 While Spotify royalties may be worth
peanuts, "no royalties . . . seems worse than little royalties . . . "118
Furthermore, if a band leaves Spotify, it is more difficult for
115. Id.
116. Ian Youngs, Songwriters Condemn Spotify, BBC (Apr. 12, 2010),
http://www.bbc.eo.uk/6music/news/20100412_spotify.shtml.
117. Mi~e Masnick, Labels Dropping Out of Spotify Are Totally Missing the
Point, TECHDIRT (Sept. 23, 2011, 6:47 AM), http://www.techdirt.com/
articles/20110922/11224716052/labels-dropping-out-spotify-are-totallymissing-point.shtml.
118. Id.
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As Rackrow suggests, Spotify's behavior degrades its reputation
among artists and writers, threatening to convert would-be advocates
into abandoners.
B.

Turning Allies Into Enemies: Artists 8 Listeners Defecting From
Spotijy

With a blanket of secrecy over their eyes, musicians must make
an i~l-informed, seemingly lose-lose choice. Should artists stay on
Spotify and collect miniscule royalties from their music? Or, should
they leave the service, forgoing Spotify revenue altogether? Spotify
a~v~cates arg~e t ~at artists who drop out of Spotify are "totally
mrnsmg the pomt, because they forgo the benefits of the service in
exchange for nothing. 117 While Spotify royalties may be worth
peanuts, "no royalties . . . seems worse than little royalties . . . "lls
Furthermore, if a band leaves Spotify, it is more difficult for
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115. Id.
116. Ian Youngs, Songwriters ?ondemn Spotify, BBC (Apr. 12, 2010),
http://www.bbc.eo.uk/6mus1c/news/20100412_spotify.shtml.
117. Mike Masnick, Labels Dropping Out of Spotify Are Totally Missing the
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potential new fans to discover them-and no band earns money in
obscurity. 119
But many artists fervently believe that when it comes to Spotify,
nothing is far better than something, even when that 'nothing' is
illegal downloading. By leading listeners to believe that artists are
being fairly compensated, Spotify's system threatens to devalue music
even more than unauthorized file sharing. According to N oiseTrade
founder and recording artist Derek Webb, this is because "when you
get music illegally it's at least implicit in the transaction that what
you're doing is potentially harmful to the artist. But with Spotify,
your conscience is clear because you're either enduring ads or paying
to use the service and access the music. "120 Another artist agreed that
it is Spotify's measly streaming rates, not music "theft," that
threatens to devalue music: "I honestly think a better model IS
invalidated illegal downloading, rather than validated streaming.
Might sound weird. But I'd rather you steal from me than insult me
121
by saying that my music is worth nothing. "
Although Spotify is often characterized as the ultimate
promotional tool, many artists feel that they're better off giving their
music away. An artist who uploads its music to a BitTorrent can
122
include a customized promotional PDF in the zip folder.
Additionally, an artist who puts his music on a pay-what-you-want
123
As one
site like NoiseTrade gets his fans' email addresses.
commentator eloquently put it, "[i]f that "something" is essentially
peanuts, and if an artist's involvement in such a system helps
maintain, or even expand, an exploitative power structure, in the
124
long-term it would be better for artists to forgo the peanuts. "
Concerned music fans have also been defecting from Spotify on
account of its treatment of artists. In writing about how a prominent

119. Id.
120. Derek Webb, Giving it Away: How Free Music Makes More Than
DEREKWEBB.TUMBLR.COM
(Dec.
1,
2011),
Sense,
http://derekwebb.tumblr.com/post/13503899950/giving-it-away-howfree-music-makes-more-than-sense.
121. Thurston, Comment to Spotify, File-Sharing and Incomplete Statistics,
NEW
MUSIC
STRATEGIES
(Nov.
20,
2011,
8:51
AM),
http://newmusicstrategies.com/2011/10/12/spotify-file-sharingincomplete-statistics.
122. Spotify, File-Sharing And Incomplete Statistics, NEW MUSIC STRATEG~ES
(Oct. 12, 2011), http://newmusicstrategies.com/2011/10/12/spotify-filesharing-incomplete-statistics.

~ndependent label had recently chosen to leave Spotify, one music
mdustry blogger decried Spotify's lack of transparency from a
consumer's point of view:

Until we know how much Spotify is making from ad income,
how much they're making from premium subscriptions (as
opposed to free memberships) and the total of how much
they're paying out in royalties - in addition to their operating
cost / overhead - it's impossible for anyone to say whether
their royalty rates are fair or not. If Spotify doesn't have much
money coming in, well, then their payout rates could in fact be
quite fair; on the flip side, if they're making bank on ads and
pocketing the profit, not cool. I've said it before and I'll say it
again, because it's very important: Spotify needs to be
forthcoming with 100%, no-bullshit transparency. It needs to
happen now. Or else it'll be clear they're hiding something. 125
This blogger's rant echoes the common-sense intuition of many
Spotify critics: if they aren't telling us anything, then they must be
hiding something. Many such critics have shut down their Spotify
accounts to protest what they believe is an exploitation of artists. 126
In short, Spotify is hardly fulfilling its prophecy of revolutionizing
To the contrary, by driving away the very
music for artists.
constituencies on whom it depends-artists and listeners-Spotify
may be laying the foundation of a self-fulfilling prophecy: its own
demise.

Ill.

SAVING THE SPOTIFY REVOLUTION: RECALIBRATING THE
POWER IMBALANCE IN DIGITAL COPYRIGHT

A.

The Reason: A Revolution Worth Saving

As things stand, artists are well-justified in distrusting the digital
jukebox Spotify. Could Spotify nonetheless be beneficial to artists
and the listening public under different conditions? · The streaming
music business model serves copyright's constitutional goals of
promoting the creation and dissemination of works. Further, as
streaming music gains traction through network effects, services like
Spotify could start to make sense out of cents through the
multiplication effect. With potential to benefit artists, the Spotify
revolution is a revolution worth saving.
Streaming music serves copyright's underlying constitutional goals
of incentivizing the creation of new works and promoting their
125. Neilstein, supra note 92.

123. Webb, supra note 119.
124. The (Pretty Damn) Weak Arguments for Spotify, MUSIC Is MED. BLOG
(Sept. 26, 2011), http://mimtunes.wordpress.com/2011/09/26/thepretty-damn-weak-arguments-for-spotify.

126. E.g., Joe Minihane, Why I'm Quitting Spotify, JOEMINIHANE.COM (Jul.
27, 2011), http:/ /joeminihane.com/2011/07 /27 /why-i3E2380399mquitting-spotify.
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~ndependent label had recently chosen to leave Spotify, one music
mdustry blogger decried Spotify's lack of transparency from a
consumer's point of view:

Until we know how much Spotify is making from ad income,
how much they're making from premium subscriptions (as
opposed to free memberships) and the total of how much
they're paying out in royalties - in addition to their operating
cost / overhead - it's impossible for anyone to say whether
their royalty rates are fair or not. If Spotify doesn't have much
money coming in, well, then their payout rates could in fact be
quite fair; on the flip side, if they're making bank on ads and
pocketing the profit, not cool. I've said it before and I'll say it
again, because it's very important: Spotify needs to be
forthcoming with 1003, no-bullshit transparency. It needs to
happen now. Or else it'll be clear they're hiding something. 125
This blogger's rant echoes the common-sense intuition of many
Spotify critics: if they aren't telling us anything, then they must be
hiding something. Many such critics have shut down their Spotify
accounts to protest what they believe is an exploitation of artists. 126
In short, Spotify is hardly fulfilling its prophecy of revolutionizing
music for artists.
To the contrary, by driving away the very
constituencies on whom it depends-artists and listeners-Spotify
may be laying the foundation of a self-fulfilling prophecy: its own
demise.

Ill.

SAVING THE SPOTIFY REVOLUTION: RECALIBRATING THE
POWER IMBALANCE IN DIGITAL COPYRIGHT

A.

The Reason: A Revolution Worth Saving

As things stand, artists are well-justified in distrusting the digital
jukebox Spotify. Could Spotify nonetheless be beneficial to artists
and the listening public under different conditions? · The streaming
music business model serves copyright's constitutional goals of
promoting the creation and dissemination of works. Further, as
streaming music gains traction through network effects, services like
Spotify could start to make sense out of cents through the
multiplication effect. With potential to benefit artists, the Spotify
revolution is a revolution worth saving.
Streaming music serves copyright's underlying constitutional goals
of incentivizing the creation of new works and promoting their
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dissemination to the public. The Progress Clause authorizes Congress
to enact copyright laws to promote "Progress." 127 Part of "Progress"
is the creation of works themselves, which have the power to expand
society's knowledge base and influence culture. 128 "Progress" also
embodies dissemination, for true societal progress cannot occur unless
the public is exposed to the works. 129 As a low-cost, decentralized
distribution model, streaming mus,ic promotes the creation of new
works by giving even fledgling artists an opportunity to deliver their
music to a worldwide audience. 130 This incentivizes the creation of an
abundant, diverse selection of music, giving listeners a broad range of
choices. 131 Further, through reducing distribution costs, file sharing
promotes dissemination, giving everyone in society, regardless of
socioeconomic status, access to music. 132
While fractions of a penny don't add up to much when only a
fraction of music listeners are plugged into Spotify, simple
mathematics show that once Spotify's membership base grows, the
numbers could start to make sense, even with royalties set at current
rates. An artist's monthly revenue on Spotify can be simplistically
modeled by the following equation, R = s x n, where R is equal to
monthly revenue, s is equal to the· per stream royalty rate, and n is
equal to the number of streams the band receives that month.
Imagine a hypothetical independent band comprised of four
members, whose goal is for each band member to make minimum
wage-$1,160 per month, per member, or $4,640 per month total.1 33
Assume the band expects for half of its revenue to come from ticket
sales, traditional CD sales, and merchandise sales, and the other half
to come from Spotify royalties. And assume a per-stream royalty rate

of $0.0008/stream, as suggested by the data discussed above. 134 The
band's monthly revenue could be modeled as follows: $2,320
$0.0008 x n. For the band to reach its monthly goal of $2,320 on
Spotify, the band must achieve 2,900,000 streams per month. The
band could achieve this level of success if 2,900,000 unique users listen
to their music once, if 580,000 fans listen to their music five times, if
290,000 fans listen to their music ten times, or some other
combination. This is no small goal, and certainly seems unrealistic
under current conditions: Spotify's user base barely exceeds 3 million
users, and it is questionable that many users would stream a band ten
or more times a month. However, if Spotify's user base grows, this
goal could be attainable.
Skeptics may look to the size of Spotify's current user base and its
poor financial performance as evidence that there is not enough
demand for a streaming music service to survive. What this fails to
recognize, however, is that new technology services like Spotify often
take years to catch on because they rely on network effects- the
phenomenon in which the value of the service rises exponentially as
the number of connected users increases. 135 With a combination of
patience and innovation, network effects can cause a service to spread
like wildfire once it reaches a critical point. 136
A modern-day example of network effects is Facebook.
If
Facebook had just one user, it would be meaningless . But if that one
user recruited 99 friends to join Facebook, the website would increase
in utility because each user would have 99 other people with whom to
interact.
Compared to the time of its inception, current-day
Facebook is infinitely more useful with its 750 million users-almost
half of the world's Internet-connected population. 137 With those
numbers, Facebook has transcended its original yearbook concept to
become more like a comprehensive world directory where you can find
anyone.
Examining the growth pattern of Facebook helps demonstrate
how a service with network effects gains traction. In its inaugural
year of 2004, Facebook had almost 1 million users. 138 At that time,
the service was limited to Ivy League networks and had minimal

127. U.S. CONST. art. 1, §8, cl. 8.
128. See LYDIA LOREN & JOSEPH MILLER, INTELLECTUAL PROP.: CASES &
MATERIALS, at 312 (describing how creation fits into "Progress" and
stating "copyright law is meant to provide an incentive . . . for
creation").
129. See id; Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 244 (2003) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (discussing how thC1 First Amendment encourages
dissemination and the importance of not depriving the public of
information).
130. C.f. Helman, supra note 21, at 100 (discussing similar benefits of file
sharing).

134. See supra, Part II.A.iii.
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federal minimum wage is $7.25 per hour ... " When multiplied by four,
representing the four complete weeks in a month, the result is a
minimum wage per month of $1,160).
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dissemination to the public. The Progress Clause authorizes Congress
to enact copyright laws to promote "Progress." 127 Part of "Progress"
is the creation of works themselves, which have the power to expand
society's knowledge base and influence culture. 128 "Progress" also
embodies dissemination, for true societal progress cannot occur unless
the public is exposed to the works. 129 As a low-cost, decentralized
distribution model, streaming musk promotes the creation of new
works by giving even fledgling artists an opportunity to deliver their
music to a worldwide audience. 130 This incentivizes the creation of an
abundant, diverse selection of music, giving listeners a broad range of
choices. 131 Further, through reducing distribution costs, file sharing
promotes dissemination, giving everyone in society, regardless of
socioeconomic status, access to music. 132
While fractions of a penny don't add up to much when only a
fraction of music listeners are plugged into Spotify, simple
mathematics show that once Spotify's membership base grows, the
numbers could start to make sense, even with royalties set at current
rates. An artist's monthly revenue on Spotify can be simplistically
modeled by the following equation, R = s x n, where R is equal to
monthly revenue, s is equal to the· per stream royalty rate, and n is
equal to the number of streams the band receives that month.
Imagine a hypothetical independent band comprised of four
members, whose goal is for each band member to make minimum
wage-$1,160 per month, per member, or $4,640 per month total.1 33
Assume the band expects for half of its revenue to come from ticket
sales, traditional CD sales, and merchandise sales, and the other half
to come from Spotify royalties. And assume a per-stream royalty rate
127. U.S. CONST. art. 1, §8, cl. 8.
128. See LYDIA LOREN & JOSEPH MILLER, INTELLECTUAL PROP.: CASES &
MATERIALS, at 312 (describing how creation fits into "Progress" and
stating "copyright law is meant to provide an incentive . . . for
creation").
129. See id; Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 244 (2003) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (discussing how the First Amendment encourages
dissemination and the importance of not depriving the public of
information).
130. C.f. Helman, supra note 21, at 100 (discussing similar benefits of file
sharing).
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$0.0008 x n. For the band to reach its monthly goal of $2,320 on
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band could achieve this level of success if 2,900,000 unique users listen
to their music once, if 580,000 fans listen to their music five times if
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combination. This is no small goal, and certainly seems unrealistic
under current conditions: Spotify's user base barely exceeds 3 million
users, and it is questionable that many users would stream a band ten
or more times a month. However, if Spotify's user base grows, this
goal could be attainable.
Skeptics may look to the size of Spotify's current user base and its
poor financial performance as evidence that there is not enough
demand for a streaming music service to survive. What this fails to
recognize, however, is that new technology services like Spotify often
take years to catch on because they rely on network effects- the
phenomenon in which the value of the service rises exponentially as
the number of connected users increases. 135 With a combination of
patience and innovation, network effects can cause a service to spread
like wildfire once it reaches a critical point. 136
A modern-day example of network effects is Facebook.
If
Facebook had just one user, it would be meaningless . But if that one
user recruited 99 friends to join Facebook, the website would increase
in utility because each user would have 99 other people with whom to
interact.
Compared to the time of its inception, current-day
Facebook is infinitely more useful with its 750 million users-almost
half of the world's Internet-connected population. 137 With those
numbers, Facebook has transcended its original yearbook concept to
become more like a comprehensive world directory where you can find
anyone.
Examining the growth pattern of Facebook helps demonstrate
how a service with network effects gains traction. In its inaugural
year of 2004, Facebook had almost 1 million users. 138 At that time,
the service was limited to Ivy League networks and had minimal
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features, such as user profiles with "walls. "139 Facebook's user base
grew to 5.5 million in 2005, when the service expanded to high schools
and added a photo application. 140 In 2006, Facebook expanded to
work networks and added the news feed feature, growing its user base
to 12 million. 141 Facebook reached the 50 million user mark in 2007 as
it began to establish an international presence and launched its
mobile application. 142 The service doubled to 100 million users in
2008, the year when Facebook chat launched. 143 By 2009 the service
had over 350 million users and a robust database of applications. 144 In
2010, the service had 500 million users, 145 and in 2011, Facebook had
reached 750 million users. indeed a critical mass compared to the
world's population of 6.7 billion people. 146 As this brief history shows,
Facebook did not reach ubiquity overnight. Yet once the service
began to catch on, its user base and revenue grew exponentially. This
is because social media is a market with network effects: the more
users that enter the system, the more beneficial it is to other would-be
users to enter .147
Like Facebook, Spotify is a service with network effects. Its
sharing feature is useful between two friends, but has the potential to
revolutionize how society shares music as the service achieves further
penetration. The more people that join Spotify, the more popular the
service will become, and therefore, the more desirable it will be to
potential users to subscribe. And fittingly, Spotify's integration with
Facebook-the premier social networking service, thanks to network
effects-will help Spotify permeate the online world much more
quickly than it could otherwise. In fact, after Facebook integrated
streaming music providers into its news ticker, Facebook users shared
their songs 1.5 billion times in a six-week period. 148
Notwithstanding these network effects, Spotify's growth won't
explode without a critical mass of users. Some sources believe that
the service has already achieved that critical mass with its entry into

the U.S. market. 149 Assuming it has not yet reached this turning
point, Spotify may need to continue innovating and improving its
service to attract more users. 15° Furthermore, to offer a product that
is truly a substitute for music ownership, Spotify will need to continue ·
growing its music library-a goal that it cannot achieve so long as it
continues driving away artists.
With the potential to be a viable money-making channel for
artists, and supporting copyright's constitutional goals, the Spotify
revolution is one worth saving.
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141. Id.
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http://mashable.com/2011/11/08/music-apps-facebook-open-graph.
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B.

The Problem: Spotify's Insulation From Pressures to Change

To determine the best course for saving the Spotify revolution, it
is worth considering why natural market and political forces have not
compelled Spotify to change already. As it turns out, Spotify is
insulated from many of the pressures that companies often endure.
Sheltered from the winds of change, Spotify has been able to sustain
its practices of non-transparency and poor compensation of artists.
One such source of pressure is the law: legislative and regulatory
enactments could, in theory, require Spotify to make more disclosures
or pay higher royalty rates. As a privately held company, Spotify is
not required to disclose information about its finances to the public or
to the Securities & Exchange Commission, and therefore remains free
149. Eliot Van Buskirk, Spotify Usage Explodes: The Social Network Effect,
EVOLVER.FM
(Sept.
30,
2011,
12:26
PM),
http://evolver.fm/2011/09/30/spotify-usage-explodes-the-socialnetwork-effect.
150. Critics have already pointed out a number of areas for improvement.
Classical music listeners in particular have been disappointed with
Spotify's lack of gapless playback between tracks: instead of playing an
album with the amount of silence between tracks that the artist
intended, Spotify inserts an additional second or two of silence,
disrupting the flow of an otherwise seamless playback. See Kirk
McElhearn, Why Spotify Sucks for Classical Music, KIRKVILLE (Jul. 15,
2011), http://www.mcelhearn.com/why-spotify-sucks-for-classical-music.
Others have criticized Spotify's search engine as "lackluster." See Zosia
Boczanowski, Spotify: Not Out of the Woods Yet, MUSIC Bus. J. (Oct.
2011),
http://www.thembj.org/2011/10/spotify-not-out-of-the-woodsyet. Some users would like to see new features, including: a parallel
browser-based application rather than requiring users to download a
desktop application, analytics tools to help artists understand Spotify's
effectiveness as a promotional tool, and better filters on the mobile
application, to name just a few,
See Id.; Data, or Lack Thereof,
UNIFORM MOTION (Sept. 27, 2011), http://uniformmotion.tumblr.com/
post/10726176237 /data-or-lack-thereof; MisterReally, Posting of As an
iPhone User I Want to Filter My Playlists With Ease, S:POTIFY FORUM
(Nov. 19, 2011, 11:23 AM), http://www.spotify-forum.com/
viewtopic. php ?f=9&t=2045&sid=60254b5dc5962b63bf8199ed6806eb4d.
For more suggestions from users on improving Spotify, see generally
Ideas/Improvements,
SPOTIFY
FORUM,
http://www.spotifyforum.com/viewforum.php?f=9 (last visited Nov. 29, 2011).
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features, such as user profiles with "walls. "139 Facebook's user base
grew to 5.5 million in 2005, when the service expanded to high schools
and added a photo application. 140 In 2006, Facebook expanded to
work networks and added the news feed feature, growing its user base
to 12 million. 141 Facebook reached the 50 million user mark in 2007 as
it began to establish an international presence and launched its
mobile application. 142 The service doubled to 100 million users in
2008, the year when Facebook chat launched. 143 By 2009 the service
had over 350 million users and a robust database of applications. 144 In
2010, the service had 500 million users, 145 and in 2011, Facebook had
reached 750 million users. indeed a critical mass compared to the
world's population of 6.7 billion people. 146 As this brief history shows,
Facebook did not reach ubiquity overnight. Yet once the service
began to catch on, its user base and revenue grew exponentially. This
is because social media is a market with network effects: the more
users that enter the system, the more beneficial it is to other would-be
users to enter .147
Like Facebook, Spotify is a service with network effects. Its
sharing feature is useful between two friends, but has the potential to
revolutionize how society shares music as the service achieves further
penetration. The more people that join Spotify, the more popular the
service will become, and therefore, the more desirable it will be to
potential users to subscribe. And fittingly, Spotify's integration with
Facebook-the premier social networking service, thanks to network
effects-will help Spotify permeate the online world much more
quickly than it could otherwise. In fact, after Facebook integrated
streaming music providers into its news ticker, Facebook users shared
their songs 1.5 billion times in a six-week period. 148
Notwithstanding these network effects, Spotify's growth won't
explode without a critical mass of users. Some sources believe that
the service has already achieved that critical mass with its entry into
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the U.S. market.
Assuming it has not yet reached this turning
point, Spotify may need to continue innovating and improving its
service to attract more users. 15° Furthermore, to offer a product that
is truly a substitute for music ownership, Spotify will need to continue
growing its music library-a goal that it cannot achieve so long as it
continues driving away artists.
With the potential to be a viable money-making channel for
artists, and supporting copyright's constitutional goals, the Spotify
revolution is one worth saving.
B.

The Problem: Spotify 's Insulation From Pressures to Change

To determine the best course for saving the Spotify revolution, it
is worth considering why natural market and political forces have not
compelled Spotify to change already. As it turns out, Spotify is
insulated from many of the pressures that companies often endure.
Sheltered from the winds of change, Spotify has been able to sustain
its practices of non-transparency and poor compensation of artists.
One such source of pressure is the law: legislative and regulatory
enactments could, in theory, require Spotify to make more disclosures
or pay higher royalty rates. As a privately held company, Spotify is
not required to disclose information about its finances to the public or
to the Securities & Exchange Commission, and therefore remains free
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(Sept.
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Classical music listeners in particular have been disappointed with
Spotify's lack of gapless playback between tracks: instead of playing an
album with the amount of silence between tracks that the artist
intended, Spotify inserts an additional second or two of silence,
disrupting the flow of an otherwise seamless playback. See Kirk
McElhearn, Why Spotify Sucks for Classical Music, KIRKVILLE (Jul. 15,
2011), http://www.mcelhearn.com/why-spotify-sucks-for-classical-music.
Others have criticized Spotify's search engine as "lackluster." See Zosia
Boczanowski, Spotify: Not Out of the Woods Yet, MUSIC Bus. J. (Oct.
2011),
http://www.thembj.org/2011/10/spotify-not-out-of-the-woodsyet. Some users would like to see new features, including: a parallel
browser-based application rather than requiring users to download a
desktop application, analytics tools to help artists understand Spotify's
effectiveness as a promotional tool, and better filters on the mobile
application, to name just a few.
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to be non-transparent about its financial flows. 151 Since it only
streams licensed music at technically bargained-for rates, Spotify is in
compliance with copyright law. 152 Moreover, no regulations directly
address streaming music. 153 The current legal framework, therefore,
does not require Spotify to change.
A second potential source of pressure is rights holders, as Spotify
depends upon the cooperation of artists and labels in building its
music library. In theory, rights holders could use their veto power
under copyright law to pressure Spotify into more favorable terms;
the problem is that Spotify already has the buy-in-both figuratively
and literally-of the major labels, which collectively own a monopoly
share of sound recordings. 154 With the vast majority of the world's
music locked down under contract, Spotify is well-poised to attract
millions of subscribers, as it has managed to do. 155 Hardly threatened
when independent artists leave the service, Spotify has the bargaining
power to offer adhesion-style licenses to independent labels on a takeit-or-leave-it basis.
A third potential source of pressure is consumers, as some
listeners care where the money goes when they pay for music. 156 If the
money makes it into the pockets of the artists themselves, listeners
may be more likely to pay up. 157 One would think, then, that more
music fans would be boycotting Spotify. Yet, as Webb has observed,
Spotify may have consumers duped. 158 Spotify gives listeners a false
151. See, e.g., WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, 1 FLETCHER CYC. CORP. § 56
("Numerous laws and regulations, especially securities laws and
regulations, apply to publicly-held corporations but not to privately-held
corporations.").
152.' See 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2002).
153. See generally Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights, 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.1 90.3 (2012).
154. See 2010 Quarter 1 Marketshare for Major Music Labels, ROUTENOTE
BLOG (Mar. 26, 2010), http://routenote.com/blog/2010-quarter-1marketshare-for-major-music-labels (reporting that major labels had
over 803 combined market share in 2010).
155. Glenn Peoples, Business Matters: Spotify Rising, Now at 10.2 Million
BILLBOARD
(Dec.
14,
2011),
Monthly
Average
Users,
http:/ /www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/industry /digital-and-mobile/businessmatters-spotify-rising-now-at-10-1005678832.story.
156. E.g., majestic12, Posting of Does The Artist I Listen To Get Paid?,
GET SATISFACTION, http://getsatisfaction.com/spotify /topics/
does the artists_i_listen_to_get_paid (last visited Dec. 13, 2011)
(askj;g Spotify, "[A]m i [sic] just paying spotify [sic] or is some of that
money going back to the artists?").
157. Id.
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impression that artists are reaping substantial financial benefits from
the service. So long as consumers harbor this belief, they likely will
not be a source of pressure for Spotify.
A fourth kind of pressure one might expect Spotify to encounterand perhaps, the most significant in saving the Spotify revolution-is
competitive pressure. Broader competition would increase innovation
in streaming music, for more firms means more creative thinkers.
Moreover, competitive pressures would likely give Spotify an incentive
to be fairer and more transparent, as transparency itself could become
a point of differentiation, one used to attract listeners concerned
about the plight of artists. 159 Yet, Spotify faces very little direct
competition at all, for an insurmountable barrier to entry stands in
the way: the major labels, who control the majority of sound
recording rights. The touchstone of streaming music is access over
ownership, so the attractiveness of a streaming service depends largely
on the breadth of its catalog. 160 To be successful, a service must
license a seemingly endless library of music. At the very least, a
streaming service needs the major label catalogs, which account for
the vast majority of recorded music. Of course, the labels' nearoligopoly gives them a formidable collective bargaining position,
particularly since copyright law grants the owners of sound recordings
an absolute right to negotiate-or to refuse to negotiate-with
interactive services like Spotify. 161 This means that the major labels
are effectively the gatekeepers of streaming music, deciding who will
enter the market and on what terms.
The gatekeepers have been very guarded as to whom they will let
pass through the doors. To date, Spotify has only a handful of direct
competitors, such as MOG, Rdio, and Rhapsody. At least two of
these, MOG and Rdio, are part-owned by the major labels, meaning
that they are plagued by the same problems as Spotify. 162 This state
of affairs strongly suggests that the major labels will not license a
streaming service unless they wield control over its vis10n.
Undergirded by the constitutional purpose of progress, copyright law
159. Helman, supra note 21, at 97-98 (2009) ("Transforming the power
balance can also increase the transparency in distribution of royalties to
artists. The accounting system utilized by the labels is unconventional,
to put it mildly. The key according to which royalties are distributed
among artists is often in the exclusive possession of the labels, and the
artists' power to object to the figures is often impractical.").
160. For a discussion of several popular streaming services and their
respective music catalogs, see Alexandra Fletcher, Assessing 10 MusicStreaming
Services,
PASTE
(AUG.
1,
2011,
11:00
AM),
http://www.pastemagazine.com/blogs/lists/2011/08/10-best-musicstreaming-services.html.
161. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2002).

158. Webb, supra note 120.

162. See Helman supra note 20.
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to be non-transparent about its financial flows. 151 Since it only
streams licensed music at technically bargained-for rates, Spotify is in
compliance with copyright law. 152 Moreover, no regulations directly
address streaming music. 153 The current legal framework, therefore,
does not require Spotify to change.
A second potential source of pressure is rights holders, as Spotify
depends upon the cooperation of artists and labels in building its
music library. In theory, rights holders could use their veto power
under copyright law to pressure Spotify into more favorable terms;
the problem is that Spotify already has the buy-in-both figuratively
and literally-of the major labels, which collectively own a monopoly
share of sound recordings. 154 With the vast majority of the world's
music locked down under contract, Spotify is well-poised to attract
millions of subscribers, as it has managed to do. 155 Hardly threatened
when independent artists leave the service, Spotify has the bargaining
power to offer adhesion-style licenses to independent labels on a takeit-or-leave-it basis.
A third potential source of pressure is consumers, as some
listeners care where the money goes when they pay for music. 156 If the
money makes it into the pockets of the artists themselves, listeners
may be more likely to pay up. 157 One would think, then, that more
music fans would be boycotting Spotify. Yet, as Webb has observed,
Spotify may have consumers duped. 158 Spotify gives listeners a false
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impression that artists are reaping substantial financial benefits from
the service. So long as consumers harbor this belief, they likely will
not be a source of pressure for Spotify.
A fourth kind of pressure one might expect Spotify to encounterand perhaps, the most significant in saving the Spotify revolution-is
competitive pressure. Broader competition would increase innovation
in streaming music, for more firms means more creative thinkers.
Moreover, competitive pressures would likely give Spotify an incentive
to be fairer and more transparent, as transparency itself could become
a point of differentiation, one used to attract listeners concerned
about the plight of artists. 159 Yet, Spotify faces very little direct
competition at all, for an insurmountable barrier to entry stands in
the way: the major labels, who control the majority of sound
recording rights. The touchstone of streaming music is access over
ownership, so the attractiveness of a streaming service depends largely
on the breadth of its catalog. 160 To be successful, a service must
license a seemingly endless library of music. At the very least, a
streaming service needs the major label catalogs, which account for
the vast majority of recorded music. Of course, the labels' nearoligopoly gives them a formidable collective bargaining position,
particularly since copyright law grants the owners of sound recordings
an absolute right to negotiate-or to refuse to negotiate-with
interactive services like Spotify. 161 This means that the major labels
are effectively the gatekeepers of streaming music, deciding who will
enter the market and on what terms.
The gatekeepers have been very guarded as to whom they will let
pass through the doors. To date, Spotify has only a handful of direct
competitors, such as MOG, Rdio, and Rhapsody. At least two of
these, MOG and Rdio, are part-owned by the major labels, meaning
that they are plagued by the same problems as Spotify. 162 This state
of affairs strongly suggests that the major labels will not license a
streaming service unless they wield control over its vis10n.
Undergirded by the constitutional purpose of progress, copyright law
159. Helman, supra note 21, at 97-98 (2009) ("Transforming the power
balance can also increase the transparency in distribution of royalties to
artists. The accounting system utilized by the labels is unconventional,
to put it mildly. The key according to which royalties are distributed
among artists is often in the exclusive possession of the labels, and the
artists' power to object to the figures is often impractical.").
160. For a discussion of several popular streaming services and their
respective music catalogs, see Alexandra Fletcher, Assessing 10 MusicStreaming
Services,
PASTE
(AUG.
1,
2011,
11:00
AM),
http://www.pastemagazine.com/blogs/lists/2011/08/10-best-musicstreaming-services.html.
161. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2002).

158. Webb, supra note 120.

162. See Helman supra note 20.
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should not enable goliath rights holders like the major labels to
leverage their market position to stifle the distribution of all musical
works. Would-be entrants to the streaming music market should be
able to access the major label catalogs at a price lower than their
souls.
·So long as Spotify remains numb to external pressuresparticularly, competitive pressures-it is unlikely it will change its
ways.
C.

The Solution: Applying Competitive Pressure Through Compulsory
Licensing

The best avenue for saving the Spotify revolution is creating a
competitive marketplace, one that the major labels cannot control by
leveraging their copyright portfolios. Enabling non-label-controlled
competitors to emerge will pressure Spotify to consider being more
transparent with artists. 163 Greater transparency will require Spotify
to be fair in its dealings with artists. With the blanket of secrecy
swept away, artists will have greater trust in Spotify as a tool that
can revolutionize music, not just in general, but for the music makers
themselves.
The great wall to entry, as discussed earlier, is the combination of
the labels' market power and holdout right. 164 While antitrust
enforcement could, in theory, be a tool to target the major record
labels' market power, it would be very difficult to develop a viable
antitrust claim without stronger evidence of collusive anticompetitive
behavior. 165 A cleaner solution is to curb the major record labels'
holdout right by making sound recording licenses compulsory for
interactive services.
Although copyright law has distinguished
between interactive and non-interactive services since the inception of
the sound recording right, 166 the distinction is not well-justified in
light of its underlying legislative history.
Sound recordings were not protected under federal law until 1972,
when Congress amended the Copyright Act of 1909 with the Sound
Recordings Act of 1971. 167 Passed in reaction to phonorecord. piracy,
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the Act conferred upon sound recordings the exclusive rights of
reproduction and distribution-but not public performance. 168 The
Ac~'s drafters contemplated including a public performance right, but
ultimately declined to include it in favor of the broadcaster lobby. 169
As digital technologies advanced and proliferated, the performance
right for sound recordings came back to the discussion table. 170 The
Copyright Office noted in a report that "[s]atellite and digital
technologies make possible the celestial J·ukebox music on demand
'
and pay-per-listen services," and that "[s]ound recording
authors and'
proprietors are harmed by the lack of a performance right in their
171
works."
Legislative discussion on the issue ensued, 172 and in 1995,
Congress enacted the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings
Act ("DPRA"), which granted sound recording rights holders the
exclusive right "to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of
a digital audio transmission. "173
As briefly mentioned in Part I, 174 the Act differentiates between
interactive and non-interactive services: whereas non-interactive
services are eligible for a compulsory license with rates set by statute,
interactive services are not eligible for the compulsory license, and
must negotiate directly with rights holders. 175 Non-interactive services
include Internet radio providers like Pandora; interactive services
include on-demand providers like Spotify. 176 The legislative history
indicates that Congress distinguished between the two categories of
providers out of a perception that "[i]nteractive services, which allow
listeners to receive sound recordings 'on-demand', pose the greatest
threat to traditional record sales. "177 Thus, Congress felt "in order to
provide a comparable ability to control distribution of their works
copyright owners of sound recordings must have the right to negotiate'

168. Rebecca F. Martin, The Digital Performance Right in the Sound
Recordings Act of 1995: Can It Protect U.S. Sound Recording
Copyright Owners in A Global Market?, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
733, 737 (1996).
169. Id.

163. See id. ("Transforming the power balance can also increase ~he
transparency in distribution of royalties to artists. The accountmg
system utilized by the labels is unconventional, to put it mildly. The key
according to which royalties are distributed among artists is often in the
exclusivepossession of the labels, and the artists' power to object to the
figures is often impractical.").

170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Digital Performing Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, 17 U.S.C. §§
106 (2002).
173. 17

164. See supra Part IV.A.

u.s.c. § 106.

174. See supra Part LC.

165. Srivastava, supra note 35, at 446; see Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1
(2004) (prohibiting agreements that unreasonably restrain trade).

175. 17

166. See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2010).

176. See id.

167. Pun. L. No. 92-140, 85 STAT. 391 (1971) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.) (Act effective Feb. 15, 1972).

177. S.REP. No. 104-128, at 24 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 356,
371.
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able to access the major label catalogs at a price lower than their
souls.
·So long as Spotify remains numb to external pressuresparticularly, competitive pressures-it is unlikely it will change its
ways.
C.

The Solution: Applying Competitive Pressure Through Compulsory
Licensing

The best avenue for saving the Spotify revolution is creating a
competitive marketplace, one that the major labels cannot control by
leveraging their copyright portfolios. Enabling non-label-controlled
competitors to emerge will pressure Spotify to consider being more
transparent with artists. 163 Greater transparency will require Spotify
to be fair in its dealings with artists. With the blanket of secrecy
swept away, artists will have greater trust in Spotify as a tool that
can revolutionize music, not just in general, but for the music makers
themselves.
The great wall to entry, as discussed earlier, is the combination of
the labels' market power and holdout right. 164 While antitrust
enforcement could, in theory, be a tool to target the major record
labels' market power, it would be very difficult to develop a viable
antitrust claim without stronger evidence of collusive anticompetitive
behavior. 165 A cleaner solution is to curb the major record labels'
holdout right by making sound recording licenses compulsory for
interactive services.
Although copyright law has distinguished
between interactive and non-interactive services since the inception of
the sound recording right, 166 the distinction is not well-justified in
light of its underlying legislative history.
Sound recordings were not protected under federal law until 1972,
when Congress amended the Copyright Act of 1909 with the Sound
Recordings Act of 1971. 167 Passed in reaction to phonorecord piracy,
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the Act conferred upon sound recordings the exclusive rights of
reproduction and distribution-but not public performance. 168 The
Ac~'s drafters contemplated including a public performance right, but
ultimately declined to include it in favor of the broadcaster lobby.169
As digital technologies advanced and proliferated, the performance
right for sound recordings came back to the discussion table. 170 The
Copyright Office noted in a report that "[s]atellite and digital
technologies make possible the celestial jukebox, music on demand,
and pay-per-listen services," and that "[s]ound recording authors and
proprietors are harmed by the lack of a performance right in their
171
works. "
Legislative discussion on the issue ensued, 172 and in 1995,
Congress enacted the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings
Act ("DPRA"), which granted sound recording rights holders the
exclusive right "to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of
a digital audio transmission. "173
As briefly mentioned in Part I, 174 the Act differentiates between
interactive and non-interactive services: whereas non-interactive
services are eligible for a compulsory license with rates set by statute
interactive services are not eligible for the compulsory license, and
must negotiate directly with rights holders. 175 Non-interactive services
include Internet radio providers like Pandora; interactive services
include on-demand providers like Spotify. 176 The legislative history
indicates that Congress distinguished between the two categories of
providers out of a perception that "[i]nteractive services, which allow
listeners to receive sound recordings 'on-demand', pose the greatest
threat to traditional record sales. "177 Thus, Congress felt "in order to
provide a comparable ability to control distribution of their works
copyright owners of sound recordings must have the right to negotiat~

168. Rebecca F. Martin, The Digital Performance Right in the Sound
Recordings Act of 1995: Can It Protect U.S. Sound Recording
Copyright Owners in A Global Market?, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
733, 737 (1996).
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163. See id. ("Transforming the power balance can also increase the
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according to which royalties are distributed among artists is often in the
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the terms of licenses granted to interactive services. "178 Congress
contemplated the idea that the DPRA could stand in the way of
technological innovation. To this end, the legislative history makes
clear that Congress intended "to provide copyright holders of sound
recordings with the ability to control the distribution of their product
by digital transmissions, without hampering the arrival of new
technologies. "179 Ironically, the DPRA does exactly the opposite of
what Congress intended with respect to streaming music. By stifling
competiti?n in the streaming music market, the DPRA is hampering
technological development and hindering artists' ability to effectively
monetize their music.
. Congress should modify the DPRA to make sound recording
licenses compulsory for interactive services. Compulsory licensing
would eliminate the labels' gatekeeping function, giving emerging
streaming services access to the labels' catalogs. Moreover, the labels
would no longer be able to leverage copyright ownership into
streaming service ownership. By its current language, the DPRA is
enabling majoritarian rights holders to prevent the use of sound
recordings. Hampering instead of helping technological innovation in
streaming music, the DPRA is exceeding the bounds of its legislative
findings and working against its intended purpose of helping rights
hol~ers monetize their digital recordings.
Moreover, it is working
a~ams~ the underlying constitutional goal of copyright, the
d1ssemmation of creative works. 180
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ADMISSIBILITY OF MET ADAT A UNDER
THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
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INTRODUCTION

How does metadata1 interact with the parol evidence rule? The
parol evidence rule often determines the success or failure of contract
litigation by excluding evidence extrinsic to a final, integrated
writing. Metadata is neither inherently intrinsic nor inherently
extrinsic to the contract, but is, in effect, a new, liminal contract
addendum which exists in nearly all modern contracts. How
metadata is classified under the parol evidence rule is therefore a
critical question for litigators and transactional attorneys.
This paper briefly discusses the parol evidence rule. It then
surveys the evolving role of metadata in law and discusses the
arguments favoring and disfavoring admissibility of the metadata that
accompanies modern contracts. The author then proposes a simple
four-factor test for jurists and litigators to use when considering the
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1.

Metadata is commonly described as "data about data." Black's law
dictionary defines metadata as "[s]econdary data that organize, manage,
and facilitate the use and understanding of primary data." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1080 (9th ed. 2009).

.Spotify, and streaming music generally, have great potential to
revolutionize music for listeners and artists. So long as the major
labels possess the strong combination of oligopoly market share and
holdout power, though, they will remain the gatekeepers of streaming
Further,
music, demanding equity as the price . of admission.
streaming services like Spotify, insulated from competitive pressures,
will likely continue in non-transparency and poor treatment of artists.
Creating a compulsory licensing scheme for streaming music will
foster the competitive climate necessary to compel the transparency
and fairness necessary for a truly successful, artist-focused Spotify
revolution.

178. Id.
179. Id.
180. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 ("To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.").
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